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CHAPl'ER I 
THE ORIGDlS OF SANTAYANA'S TRANSCENDENTAL MATERIhLISM 
While it is true that the influence of hereditary and 
environmental fact~rs on a man's philosophy can be overem-
phasized, it is only natural to believe that these factors are 
of some account in the molding of his thought. This is defi-
nitely the case in the philosophy of George Santayana. Indeed, 
Santayana himself characterizes his philosophy as a synthesis 
of Spanish and American traditions.l Traditions in their 
original and vital expression are oral. It will be ot ad~n­
tage, . then, to study in detail the men with whom the young 
Santayana came in contact at Harvard, because there, in the 
dynamio interplay of intelle cts, Santayana's supple mind was 
steeped in akaleidoscopio philosophical tradition, to which 
each professor contributed his own hue. During his own teach-
ing years at Harvard, Santayana transmitted this same tradi-
tion, flecked with the ideas of his masters, but suffused with 
. 
the fresh light of his own thought. And finally, since philo-
sophical content and presentation are circum~cribed by the 
author's purpose in philosophizing and his attitude towards 
philosophy, an understanding of these factors will prove an 
1 Paul A. Schilpp (Editor) I The Philosophy of George Santa-
~, The Library of LivlDg PhIlosophers series, North-
~ern University, Evanston and Chicago, II, 1940, 3. 
1 
invalua ble source for a c17stal-clear comprehension of, and 
sympathy for, Santayana's philosophy. 
2 
George Santayana was born in Madrid on the sixteenth of 
December t eighteen hundred and sixty-three. His father had 
spent many years as a government o1'1'icial in the Philippines. 
Mrs. Santayana, who had previously married Nathaniel SturgiS, 
an American merchant resident in Manila, likewise had a Philip-
pine background, since her father had also been employed in 
the Spanish service. Consequently it is not surprising that 
Santayana has lived 1'ram childhood, as he tells us, in the 
imaginative presence of interminable ocean spaces and coconut 
islands.2 During the years this child's imagination was to 
know an unusual development; and the importance of the role 
of this faculty in Santayana's philosophy ought to be grasped 
at the very beginning of this thesis, since it will run 
through this paperllke a fugue. For Santayana, metaphysics 
is an excursus of the mind over the faots of fanoy;3 and the 
imagination is the great unifier of humanity.4 
What are some of those influences which molded the contour 
2 Schilpp, 4. 
3 George Santayana, The Realm. of Spirit, Chas. Scribner's 
Sons, New York, 1940, 274. 
4 George Santayana, Inte1retation of Poetry and Religion, 
Chas. Soribner's Sons, ew York, 1900, 9. 
.. 
3 
of this child's imagination? One of the chief was his.mother, 
a cool, stoical woman, as her son recalls her, who disdained 
the corruption about her.5 Did her son inherit any of his 
mother's aloofness? Perhaps, for Will Durant focuses upon 
this point in his critique of Santayana, with the result that 
he characterizes him as a Spanish grandee who views our little 
systems with UDwondering and superior eye.6 While aloofness 
would not necessarily be an inherited characteristic, the power 
of example is considerable. Add to this the fact that as a 
child Santayana was brought to America to be educated with his 
Sturgis relatives. Undoubtedly the problem of adjustment was 
a severe trial to his sensitive soul. Is it surprising that 
the lonely boy withdrew into himself to live in his own dream-
world? 
Traces of these early influences are to be found in Santa-
yana's philosophy. It is an other-worldly philosophy, the 
philosophy of a man without a country, since he became alien-
ated from. Spain,7 and, as :Mr. Durant observes: "1},is soul, 
softened with much learning, and sensitive as a poet's souT 
must be (for he was poet first, and philosopher afterward), 
suffered fram the noisy baste of American city-1ife.ne His 
5 Schilpp, 4. 
6 Will Durant, The StOry of PhilOSOph!, Garden City Publish-
ing Co., Garden CIty, New York, 19~, 367. 
7 Schilpp, 7. . 
8 Durant, 366. 
philosoph7 is that of the lover of peaoe and solitude who is 
• 
buffeted about b7 a oruel world, and seeks, therefore, peaoe 
and freedom of spirit in a realm beyond the reaohes of harsh, 
oomplex material existenoe. The philosophical expression of 
this storm-tossed spirit is, as a oonsequenoe, tinged with 
melanoholy: 
••• it is a veraoious and fearless self-
expression; here a mature and subtle 
though too sombre, soul has written Itself 
down quietly, in statuesque and olassio 
prose. And though we may not like its 
minor key, its undertone of sweet regret 
for a vanished world, we see in it the 
finished expression of this dying and 
nasoent age, in whioh men oannot be al-
together wise and free. 9 
4 
Fina1l7, there is one more home-influenoe to be mentioned, 
the religious influenoe. Like his parents before him, Santa-
yana oonsiders himself, nominally at least, a Catholic. But a 
better expression of his religious creed oan be found in his 
statement: "Religions are the great fairy-tales of the con-
soienoe."lO Indeed, it is most difficult to reoonoile his 
searoh for peace and enlightenment of spirit with his espousal 
of the darkness of disillusion. Yet he has chosen the latter: 
For my own part, I was quite sure that 
life was not worth living; for if reli-
gion was false everything was worthless, 
and almost everything, if religion was 
true. • • I saw the same alternative be-
tween Catholicism and complete disillu-
9 Durant, 380-381. 
10 Schilpp, 8. 
p 
sion: but I was never afraid Of disil-
lusion, and I have chosen it.~ 
• 
, santayana graduated with the bachelor's degree from Har-
vard in 1882. The graduate's life-time spanned a period in 
which rationalism and materialism were in the ascendency. 
The decades or the seventies and eighties 
were the very pilmacle of rationalism and. 
materialism, before the reaction of the 
nineties set in. They were the decades 
of Huxley and Leslie Stephen in England! . 
of Ta1ne and Renan in France, or Haecke 
and DUhring in Germany, ,of the Forta1f,t-
ly Review', the Nineteenth Century, an1he 
Revue des Deux Mondes • At Harvard, 
Charles ElIot Norton, more than the pro-
fessors of philosophy, was imbued with I 
this Zeitg:ist... Now Santayana, for all 
his detac ent, kept abreast of the times 
and could not help absorbing much ot this 
scientific and sceptical spirit.12 
Still, Santayana claims to be outside the watershed of nine-
teenth century philosophical thought.13 But the reader of 
The Life of Reason will find that it breathes the very spirit 
of nineteenth century rationalism.14 Without doubt Santayana, 
in claiming to be divorced fram the thought of his day, has 
overlooked the very decided, although unconscious, influence 
of various writings in molding his general mentality. 
11 Ibid., 7-8. 
12 G.W~Howgate, George Santayana, (A dissertation) University 
of Penn. Press, philadelphia, 1938, 25-26. 
13 Schilpp, 12. 
14 Cf. Hawgate, 132-133. 
5 
6 
Santayana admits that d:uring his undergraduate data he 
oame under the spell of William James and Josiah Royoe, the 
free-thought leaders of the times, for whom, however, he says 
he had more wonder than agreement. l5 He believes that as a 
novioe-philosopher he was more attraoted by the teaohings of 
Royoe than those of James. l6 Royoe, the leader of the volun-
taristic wing of the Post-Hegelian Idealists, was more akin to 
Fiohte than to the other members of that sohool. His philos-
ophy presents a synthesis of elements gathered from. different 
sohools: an a-priori metaphysios, a touoh of British empiricism, 
ooupled with Hegelian monism. and pantheism, and blended with 
Amerioan individualism and moral dualism. l7 
What influenoe did suoh a philosopher have on Santayana? 
It was from Royoe that he oulled his relative morality. Santa-
yana oonfess~s that his soholastio logio tempted him to reduoe 
Royoe to a solipsist.18 Yet Royce was no mean dialectitian 
himself. A.s an idealist of the general Hegelian type, he 
neoessarily relied on his dialeotioal acumen; and through this 
faoility, states'Santayana, he opened vistas to his students, 
and disturbed Santayana's too easy dogmatism.. l9 
15 Sohi1pp, 8. 
16 Ibid., 10. . 
17 D .Malone (Editor), The Diotionary of Amerioan Biography, 
Chas. Soribner's Sons, New York, 1943, XVI, 20'. 
18 Sohi1pp, 8. 
19 George Santayana, Persons and Places: The BaC~round ot 
My Life, Chas. Soribner's Sons,-New York, 194~ 244. 
, 
Although Santayana olaims that he remembers more Of James' 
l1l8.D.Ilerisms tban his ~eaohings, 20 his empirioism testit'ies to 
the effioacy of James' influenoe. The empiricism of the master 
eohoes in Santayana's theory of knowledge. Their oorrespond-
enoe manifests the sympathy of James for his pupU' s empiri-
cism, but not for his Platonism. To James' radioa1 empirioism, 
together with Berkeleyts nominalism, Santayana attributes the 
oredit of leading him to the realm ot essence.21 It was James 
again, not so muoh in his aotua1 teaching, but rather in the 
spirit and background of that teaohing, who gave to the young 
Santayana his idea ot the utterly irrational nature ot exist-
ence: "the unadulterated, unexplained, instant faot ot exper-
ience."22 
But for the later teaohings ot his former master, Santa-
yana lost all sympathy. In his more mature years James tried 
to make his philosophy a philosophy ot reality. 
He suggested a new physics or metaphysics 
in which the essences given in immediate 
eXperience should be deployed and hyposta-
tized into the oonstitutents ot nature: 
but this pictorial cosmology had the 
disadvantage ot abolishing the human 
imagination, with all the pathos and 
poetry ot its animal status. James 
20 Ibid., 241-242. 
21 l'61'!'., 242 • 
22 ECEI1pp, 15. 
thus renounced the gift for literary 
psychology, that romantic insight, in 
which alone he excelled; and indeed his 
followers are without it. I pride my-
self on remaining a disciple of his 
earlier unsophisticated self, when he 
was an agnostic about the universe, but 
in his diagnosis of the heart an impul-
sive poet: a master in the art of record-
ing or divining the lyric quality of ex-
perien~s as it actually came to him or 
to me. 
• 
Clearly santayana rejects James' philosophy of reality on the 
grounds of disloyalty to the imagination. 
8 
Another member of Harvard's philosophy department during 
Santayana's undergraduate days was Professor Palmer. Santa-
yana mentions little about Palmer: he merely says that he in-
dicated to him the verbal cogency of dialectic and acquainted 
him with the English Moralists.24 Perhaps Santayana's affinity 
to these Moralists can be traced to the lectures of Palmer. In 
Santayana can be found that same preference for the imagination, 
and the corresponding diminution of the power of reason. But 
more probably the idea of a sentiment which is a determination 
of human nature came to Santayana from Hume, whose environment 
was charged with the teachings of the Moralists. Professor 
Palmer was gifted with a comprehensiveness of view and an in-
23 Ibid., 16-17. 
24 persons and Places, 247. 
9 
tellectual sympathy, which enabled him to fire the imagina-
tions of his students with sweeping panoramas, and bend· their 
minds "to a suave and sympathetic participation in the views 
of all philosophers in turn."25 Yet his "scholastic dogmatism" 
disturbed the young Santayana, and coerced him to ask himself 
what was true. 26 
The works of previous philosophers were undoubtedly a 
source of further inspiration to the young Santayana. He re-
calls that 
The only solid foundation for all my play 
with this subject was supplied by the stur-
dy but undeveloped materialism of Hobbes, 
powerfully supported by the psychology of 
Spinoza and insecurely by the earlier med-
ioal psychology of James: to which in Ger-
many my passing ~~thusias.m for Schopenhau-
er may be added. 
He discovered, he claims, the foundation for his philosophy in 
several respects, notably as regards morality, in a careful 
study of the "ipsissima verba" of Spinoza. 28 But to Fichte 
and Schopenhauer must be ascribed the combination of those two 
elements which are to be examined in this thesis, his tran-
scendentalism and his materialism. By showing Santayana that 
he must oscillate between a radical transcendentalism and a 
materialism, these earlier philosophers taught him, he main-
25 Schilpp, 9. 
26 Ibid. 
27 PerSons and Places, 248. 
28 Ibid., 243. 
tains, the causes of knowing and becoming of immediate.exper-
ience.29 
10 
For three years, while sharing the Walker Fellowship with 
Charles A. strong, Santayana pursued his studies abroad, where 
he lived under the aegis of Paulsen and Simmel in Berlin. 
Simmel's materialistic interpretation of conduct was in line 
with Santayana's own inclination; and his relativism, as How-
gate remarks, "may have encouraged santayana to think of 
ethics, history, religion, and even metaphysics as autonomous 
creations, constructions of the mind, rather than as revela-
tions of absolute fact.,,30 Paulsen was a panoramist like 
Palmer, who expounded the "sweet-reasonableness" of the Greeks 
to the eager Santayana with a considerably more telling effect 
than did his American contemporary. The harmony and balance 
of Greek life and thought appealed to the poetic Santayana, an.d 
from that time he found in the ancients the natural support and 
point of attachment for his own philoSOphy.3l Long after his 
Fellowship days had passed, Santayana spent a sabbatical year, 
1896-1897, in England, where he read Plato and Aristotle under 
Jackson. He became convinced that the Pre-Socratic Greeks, 
notably the Atomists, had reached orthodoxy in natural philos-
29 Schilpp, 17. 
30 Howgate, 33. 
31 Schilpp, 13. 
11 
ophy;,while he believed the Post-Sooratios to have att~ined 
this same orthodoxy in morals. 52 This "orthodoxy" in two lines 
of investigation is what has enhanoed Greek philosophy in 
Santayana's eyes. 
The Greeks in their sanity disoovered 
not only the natural world but the art 
of living well in it ••• The sentiments 
and maxims, whilst very properly di-
verse, had all of them a certain noble 
frankness in the presenoe of the infi-
nite world, of which they begged no 
favors. Nature was essentially under-
stood and honestly described; and ••• 
for that very reason, the free mind 
could disentangle its true good, and 
could express it in art, in manners, 
and even in the most refined or the 
most austere spiritual discipline. 35 
While in England, Santayana oontacted James' old friend, 
Dr. Hodgson. Regarding his former professor's friend, 
Santayana is unoommunioative, but not so Professor James. 
James quotes a favorite maxim of Hodgson's in his Prinoiples: 
t~atever you are totally ignorant of, assert to be the ~x­
planation of everything e1se."54 To what extent Santayana 
suocumbed to Hodgson's influence is difficult to discern. The 
two men are Significantly alike in regarding the immediate de-
liverance of consciousness as conSisting of essences, and not of 
52 8ohilpp, 22. 
35 George Santayana, SOlilOauies in England and Later 80lilo-
,uies, Chas. Soribner's ons, New York, 1922, 214. 
541111am James, The Principles of PSychology, Henry Holt & 
Co., New York, 1931, I, 347. 
12 
existence s. 35 
• 
It becomes clear to the reader of Santayana's philosophy 
that, however much he admired the Greeks and intended to an-
chor his speculations on Greek thought, his attitude towards 
philosophy is altogether different from that of his ancient 
models. Thales and the early Ionians were seeking in their 
physics a "world-stuff," a material principle for the world 
which they investigated. The problem of change in this world 
perplexed them, and contrary solutions to this difficulty were 
proferred by Heraclitus and Parmenides. The atomic theory of 
Democritus and Leucippus likewise aimed at being a solution 
to this problem in the real world. Is Santayana's philosophy 
a philosophy in the Greek sense of the term, an attempt to 
explain reality? Santayana eschews metaphysics, and contends 
that his own system is metaphysical only in a literary 
sense.36 He views metaphysics as an attempt to establish 
truths about nature and existence otherwise than by observa-
tion, measurement, and experiment.37 His system is a system 
of logical essences, and 
35 R.P.Barton, The ThOught and Character of William James, 
Little, Brown & do., Boston, 1935, I, 614. 
36 ~irit, 274. 
370rge SantaYana, "The Realm of Essence," in Realms of 
Beins, Chas. Scribner's Sons, New York, 1942, 175. 
p 
essence, truth, and spirit are indeed 
non-physical; but for-that very reason 
they are not to be invoked at all in 
physics or cosmology, which 4ea1s with 
common sense facts---assumed to exist 
by themse1ves---and studies their fac-
tual relations without pret~ding to 
explain or understand them. 
15 
• 
Unlike the philosophy of the Greeks, Santayana's is not a phi-
losophy of reality. A letter to James of December 18, 1887 
shows that this was already his pOSition at that early date. 
If philosophy were the attempt to solve 
a given problem, I should see reason to 
be discouraged about its success; but it 
strikes me that it is rather an attempt 
to express a half-undiscovered reality, just as art is, and that two different 
renderings, if they are expressive, far 
from oanoelling each other add to each 
other's value. The great bone of philos-
ophy is the theological animus which 
hurries a man toward final and intolBrant 
truths as towards his salvation. Such 
truths may be necessary to men but phi-
10,sophy can hardly furnish them. It can 
only interpret nature, in parts with 
accuracy, in parts only with a vague sym-
bolism. I confess I do not see why we 
should be so vehemently curious about the 
absolute truth, Which is not to be made 
or altered by our discovery of it. But 
philosophy seems to me to be its own re-
ward, and its justification lies in the 
delight and dignity of the art itself. 59 
It thus becomes more and more obvious to Santayana's 
reader that the author intended no system, but merely took 
38 George Santayana, A personal letter to the author, June 15, 
1947. Cf. Appendix II. 
39 Barton, 402. 
p 
delight in speculation for itself.40 In fact, Santayana has 
. . 
definite views on systems, seeing in them only a natural tend-
ency to adhere stubbornly to one's own opinion.41 His philos-
ophy, he maintains, is not scientific. It is a lay religion,42 
for "the goal of speculative thinking is no other than to live 
as much as may be in the eternal, and to absorb and be absorbed 
in the truth."43 It is in this final expression of his atti-
tude toward philosophy that Santayana betrays not only his 
affinity to the Indian philosophemof Nirvana and Brahma, but 
also gives us complete justification for characterizing his 
philosophy as other-worldly. 
Nevertheless, Santayana claims to be a scholastic philos-
opher at heart,44 a scholastic in his principles, not in his 
ways.45 Undoubtedly a scholastic philosopher would object to 
this claim of relationship, and insist that his only kinship 
with Santayana is a penchant for distinctions. 
40 Persons and Places, 250. 
41 w. G. iuelder and Laurence Sears (Editors), "The Genteel 
Tradition in American Philosophy" by George Santayana, 
179-190, The Development of American.Philosophy, Houghton 
Mifflin Co., Boston~1940, 184. 
42 Spirit, 273~ 
43 George santayana! Reason in Cammon Sense, Chas. Scribner's 
sonsl New York, 905, !8 •. 44 Schi pp, 604. 
45 Ibid. 
F 
15 
The task of summarizing the manifold sources of iutluence 
on Santayana's philosophy is rendered difficult because his 
philosophy seems to be a texture of his family history, the 
philosophers he studied under, his health, his ideas on the 
United states, Italy, Spain, wine, modern teaching methods, 
the architectural teaching methods of Europe, flowers, and 
diverse similar topics. The dominant themes, however, in his 
philosophy can be indicated: Platonism, materialism, and 
scepticism, for his thought is 
••• reminiscent equally of Greek idealism, 
materialism and scepticism, of Indian, 
neo-Platonic and medieval mysticism, of 
medieval scholastic distinctions and mod-
ern psychology.45 
45 Celestine J. Sullivan, Jr., "Santayana's Philosophical 
Inheritance," Schilpp, 53-92, 55. 
CHAPrER II 
THE NATURE OF SANTAYANA'S TRANSCENDENTAL MATERIAJ3ISM 
Santayana has tersely expressed his philosophical position 
in a single 'sentence: 
We must oscillate between a radical tran-
scendentalism, frankly reduced to a solip-
sism of the living moment, and a material-
ism posited as a presupposition of oonven-
tiona1 sanity.1 
The logioa1 procedure is first to attain a olear understanding 
of the significanoe which the terms "transcendentalism" and 
"materialism" have for Santayana. With this\ understanding it 
remains to be seen whether a philosophy based on these two ele-
ments is sound and consistent. This is the line of investiga-
tion to be taken in the following chapters. 
The first thing to note about Santayana's radical tran-
scendentalism is that it is not a pure transcendentalism, which 
denies the existenoe of objective reality; and that the solip-
sism to which it is reduced is a solipsism only in the sense 
that he does not know what this objective reality is, although 
he knows that it is. In The Realm of Essenoe Santayana affords 
us a somewhat clearer notion of this solipsism of the living 
moment. 
Nothing is present to the spirit at any 
1 Schi1pp, 17. 
16 
time but what is then present to it; 
this cannot be in the least altered by 
the tact that other things may have 
been. present to it, or to other spirits, 
at other times.2 
1'1 
This passage seems to indicate merely that one knows what he 
knOws, just the present atom of experience which is here and 
noW before him, as Hume might say. In this present experience 
ot looking out ot the window, I know the tree which stands be-
tore me. The tact that I know it is sufficient; the B2! and 
why ot knowing remain mysteries. This interpretation seems 
justitiab1e in the light of a section of The Realm ot Matter, 
where Santayana treats of the two phases of transcendentalism: 
the sceptical one of retreat to the immediate datum of exper-
ience, and the assertive one, by which the objects whioh are 
posited by a transcendental faith are defined and marshalled 
in such an order as intelligent action demands.3 It is appar-
ent that santayana uses the term "transoendental" in two dif-
ferent senses: first, in the sense of "idealistic," since the 
immediate datum of experience, as subsequent observation will 
reve&l, is an essence, an ideal or logical term; and second, in 
the sense in which Kant speaks of a transcendental use of 
knowledge; that is, knowledge in which the knowing subject 
goes beyond itself to the object which is the cause of its 
2 Essence, 151. 
3 George Santayana, "The Realm of Matter," in Realms of Being, 
Chas. Scribner's Sons, New York, 1942, 200. 
18 
idea. This act of transcendence is accomplished by thl "spir-
it," and Santayana says that this is the only transcendental 
part of his system .. 4 In this thesis, however, "transcendental" 
is used in the first sense, meaning "idealistic". 
It oan readily be seen that "transcendental materialism" 
is primarily concerned with the critical problem, since it is 
intended by Santayana to bridge the gap between the knowing 
subject and the thing known. 5 The spirit, the transoendental 
function of the "psyche," is the knowing subject, which is pro-
vided with the data of experience in terms of essences, of log-
ical entities. Yet sanity tells Santayana that he eats things, 
that he touches things, things 'outside of h~selt; and since 
these things are tangible, visible, and edible, they are con-
stituted of matter. Wherefore, "matter is properly a name for 
the actual substance of the natural world, whatever that sub-
stance may be."6 Now matter, in Santayana's eyes, is only a 
presupposition of conventional sanity,7 since he does not know 
these material things, 'but merely the essences Which symbolize 
them. It is the part of the natural SCiences, he frequently 
reiterates,S to investigate these material facts; and Santayana 
himself is not a physicist. None the less he swears allegiance 
4 Geo. Santayana, Letter to the author, Apr. 16, 1947, Cf. 
A~pend-i:X: I. 
5 e. Sch11pp, 17-18. 
6 Matter, 332. 
7 Sch11pp, 17. 
8 Letter of dune 15, 1947. 
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to the atomic theory as the only possible physical explana~ 
tion,9 and eulogizes Father Democritus as the possessor of "an 
indefensible faith in a single radical insight, which happened 
nevertheless to be true."lO 
Santayana fS own "faith" must be further examined. Not-
withstanding his innate hostility to dogmatism, in Scepticism 
and Animal Faith he enunciates two fundamental dogmas: the 
belief in himself, and in the existing world which action pos-
tulates.ll These two dogmas are of a piece with his afore-
mentioned pre-supposition, materialism, in that both himself 
and the existing world are reductively material. Now a rigid 
materialist has no right to speak of consciousness and other 
psychic states; consequently Santayana can not be classified as 
a strict materialist. For him, matter is not the only reality 
in the world, but it is the only substance, power and force in 
the world.12 This is an important fact to g~sp, and it finds 
expression in any number of Santayana's works. 13 He is deter-
mined that matter alone must be the ultimate principle. How 
this matter can generate an immaterial spirit, 
9 Matter, 231. 
10 Irwin Edman, (Editor), The Philosophy of Santa~na, The Mod-
ern Library Edition, Random House, New York, ~2, 293. 
11 Geo. Santayana, sce~ticism and Animal Faith, Chas.Scribner's 
Sons, New York, 192 , 243. ct. "The Realm of Truth" in 
Realms of Being, 457. 
12 Scliilpp, 509. 
13 Cf.Matter, 234-235, 328; and Geo. Santayana, The Realm of 
Spirit, 186, 196. 
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a moral stress of varying scope and in-
tensity, full of will and selectiveness, 
arising in animal bodies, and raising 
their private vicissitudes into a moral 
experience ,14 
20 
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is a problem even for Santayana, who rests content to note it 
as a brute fact. 15 One wisnes for a solution to this problem, 
for it is the basis of his apparently paradoxical stand as an 
idealistic materialist. 
Mind owes its origin, growth, and de-
velopment to matter, but the strange 
child repays his parent a hundredfold 
with the riches he pours in her lap. 
Nature gives birth to consciousness; 
consciousness gives value to nature. 16 
In The Realm of. Matter Santayana indicates how a materialist 
might be a true idealist, by preferring the study of essence to 
that of matter.17 Yet Santayana's materialism has been devised 
to keep his poetic ecstasies in their proper place. Does not 
this materialism seem inadequate to the task, since it must 
fall back on the extraordinary to account for mind and spirit? 
It is disconcerting to the reader of Santayana when he 
begins to understand that this materialism rests on a belief. 18 
The dominance of matter in every exist-
ing being, even when that being is spirit-
ual, is the great axiom of materialism, 
14 Spirit, VIII. 
15 SchIlpp, 17. 
16 Howgate, 110. 
17 Matter, 382. 
18 Truth, 453. 
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to which this book is only a corollary.19 
This materialism, or naturalism as he sometimes calls it, is an 
assumption,20 not an academic opinion, but an everyday convic-
tion2l in which he has always believed. 22 
Mr. Howgate (who, it may be said in passing, though he 
recognizes many inadequacies in Santayana's explanations, 
shares none of his sympathy for Catholicism or Scholasticism) 
remarks that Santayana's dogmatism enables him "to march boldly 
and consistently through an undergrowth of metaphysiCS which 
might entrap the more circum~pect philosopher."23 A closer 
analysis of Santayana's philosophy reveals the truth of this 
statement, but not quite as Mr. Howgate intended it. Philoso-
phy, in the general acceptation of the ter.m, is a science of 
causes. Since Santayana has rejected a theory of causality, he 
has developed a philosophy of description, pe~sonal and subjec~ 
tive. 24 Confronted by the "brute fact"25 of materialism, he 
can penetrate no further. 
The question naturally arises: is he justified in accept-
19 Matter, 292. 
20 Spirit, 174. 
21 sChllpp, 12. 
22 Howgate, 239. 
23 Ibid., 110. 
24 ~Schilpp, 605. This personal element is best seen in 
Santayana's dealing with his adversaries. 
25 Schilpp, 504-505. 
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ing this "brute fact," and is it as brutal as he makes ~t? 
Santayana has sufficient justification for this supposition if 
matter, as the only power and foroe in the universe, is capable 
of explaining the essential difference between living and non-
living beings, between animals and men. But what philosophioal 
evidenoe does Santayana offer for suoh a position? He has 
olaimed that his materialism is the oonviotion of his "exper-
ience and observation of the world at large."26 But his exper-
ience should indioate to h~ an essential elevation of man over 
the brute, manifested in the power to speak, to generalize, and 
to make progress. And yet oommonly he uses the generic term 
"animal" to designate animals and men,27 implying that there is 
no fundamental difference. In fine, he believes that man sur-
passes inanimate oreation only because external ciroumstanoes 
have been more favorable to him. 
Aocordingly the analogy of nature would 
suggest that the other living oreatures 
in the world are animate too and dis-
oourse privately no less assidUOUSly and 
absurdly than I do. It would even sug-
gest that all the su.stanoe of nature is 
ready to think, if oircumstances allow 
by presenting something to think about, 
and-creating the appropriate organ ••• a 
stone will think like me, in so far as 
it lives like me.28 
But this passage ought to be read side by side with his address, 
26 Ibid., 12. 
27 Matter, 233. 
28 SceptIcism and Animal Faith, 250. 
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The Genteel Tradition in Amerioan Philosophy. A sharp.oontrast 
is presented. 
By their mind, its soope, quality, and 
temper, we ~stimate men, for by the mind 
only do we exist as men, and are more 
than so many storage-batteries for mater-
ial energy. Let us therefore be frankly 
humanA9 Let us be oontent to live in the mind.~ 
It seems that the idealist has forsaken his materialism. 
Santayana is oognizant of the objection that matter of it-
self can not explain life. His response to this diffioulty is, 
incidentally, illustrative of his passion for subtle distinc-
tions. He points out that when a man says: "Matter can not ex-
plain the origin of life, of oonsoiousness, or of morals," he 
means his own idea of matter. Sinoe a man's idea of matter is, 
in Santayana's terminology, an essenoe, then Santayana heartily 
agrees with h~, because no essence can be the origin of any-
thing, either of another essence or of any faot. But real 
matter, says Santayana, is a hidden power, and its capaoities 
are unknown to the mind of man. Accordingly, the materialist 
is incapable of offering any rational explanation of things, 
and must rely on desoription. 30 It is to be noted that after 
all is said and done, Santayana returns to his basio supposi-
tion, that matter is the source of all things. 
29 Muelder-Sears, 190. 
30 Essence, 140. 
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It may be that the root of this basic supposition~ies in 
Santayana's observation of the fact that living beings need 
matter for their conservation. 31 Could it be that in recogniz-
ing this need for matter by living beings in this world, Santa-
yana has concluded that these beings must be constituted of 
matter, and only matter, even though his conclusion does not 
seem oapable of explaining their life? Since matter is neces-
sary, why not postulate a material principle? But, in addition, 
why not inolude an immaterial prinoiple which can explain life? 
Summarily, this difficulty might be phrased: how can an immate-
rial issue from a material? can an effect exceed its cause? 
Dr. Rudolf Allers in his critique of Freudianism, The Suo-
cessful Error, manifests a further consequence of any material-
istic philosophy: the rejection of all oausality save that of 
the efficient oause. 32 Causation, as explained in The Realm of 
Truth, oan be reduced to a mere sucoession of one thing from 
another.33 Certainly an effeot does succeed its cause. Since 
Santayana's materialism can give him no explanation of oausa-
tion from intrinsic principles, he can only desoribe this suc-
cession which he observes as causality.- But even Santayana ad-
31 Matter, 288; Cf. Soepticism, 109. 
32 Rudolf Allers, M.D.,ph.D., The Successful Error: A Critioal 
Study in Freudian Psyohoanalysis, Shead and Ward, New York, 
1940, 94. 
33 Truth, 504. 
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mits that in mere succession there is no necessity, not even in 
• 
the "so-called laws of nature. n34 
This generalization, embracing even the laws of nature, 
inclines Santayana's reader to suspect that this whole question 
of causality could be cleared up if some distinction were made 
between absolute necessity or consequence and physical neces-
sity, in which latter, because of the nature of physical laws, 
some exception might occur.55 But Santayana seems to prefer 
to center upon the exception and claim absolute spontaneity. 
Yet immediately following upon this assertion he retracts to 
some degree by stating that this particular event will recur 
"spontaneously" if the same external circumstances are given. 
Santayana faces a real problem in reconciling his assertion of 
spontaneity with his equally emphatiC claim for uniformity in 
nature, especially when he realizes himself that life is prac-
tically impossible if everything is absolutely spontaneous. 56 
Here it might be noted that Santayana ascribes a peculiar 
efficacy to external conditions, while he assiduously denies 
this same efficacy to a body submitted to these conditions. 
For example, the production of a rose from a certain seed is 
not, in Santayana's mind, due to the seed, but to the soil and 
54 Letter of April 16, 1947: Cf. Matter, 305-4. 
55 Matter, 299-500. 
56 Ibid., 201-202. 
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olimate, which, it he would so speak, "nourish" the seed. 37 He 
tavors an absolute potentiality tor every seed, oapable ot 
varying its speoifio torm beoause ot the oonditions. Undoubted-
ly with suoh absolute spontaneity it would not 'be neoessary to 
buy pea seeds were one to wish pea vines. Besides, would it be 
possible to have turnips and violets growing next to eaoh 
other? The external conditions would seem to favor one or the 
other, but not both. 
Consistent with his limitation ot oausality to eftioienoy, 
Santayana rejeots teleology or finality. And yet this state-
ment ought not to be made categorioally. In The Realm ot 
Matter be speaks ot a oertain "mook explanation" in what is 
oalled teleology; namely, "When the ground ot things is sought 
in their exoellenoe, in their har.mony with their surroundings, 
or in the adaptation of organs to their. functions and ot actions 
to their intentions."38 Still, he asserts, such correspond~ 
ences actually exist in the world, and "teleology, it it be 
only a name for them, is a patent and prevalent fact in 
nature. "39 But how is this taot to be explained? Onoe again 
attention is diverted to external oonditions, which seem to be 
invested with an unusual causal potenoy. The explanation ot 
37 Ibid., 289-290. 
38 Ibid., 310. 
39 ~. 
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the intrinsic finality of the thing itself which is submitted 
.. 
to these conditions is evasive. 
Instead, we must attribute the pursuit 
of this good, and its eventual realiza-
tion, to her previous blind disposition, 
fortified by the fact that circumstfBces 
were favorable to that development. 
This explanation provokes two questions. What proof has 
santayana for the efficacy of the circumstances? Is there more 
evidence for the action of these external factors than for the 
hidden force, the "blind disposition" of the thing? Moreover, 
is it philosophical to rest content with this "blind disposi-
tion"? To all appearances Santayanats materialism has left htm 
without any ultimate explanations. The opinion stated above4l 
as to the personal and descriptive nature of Santayana's phi-
losophy would seem to be verified here. He has observed the 
fact of t~leology in nature and describes it, although he pre-
fers another name for this fact. But description is not ex-
planation, and one finds a "previous blind disposition" oper-
ating under favorable conditions not a whit more elucidating. 
Two factors seem accountable for this teleological doc-
trine, and ultimately both of these factors can be resolved 
into one. The first is ~antayanats materialism, the inevitable 
cause of his failure to offer an adequate explanation. The 
40 Ibid., 323. 
41 ~, 21. 
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seoond is the understanding, so painful to Santayana, of the 
• 
oonsequenoes to which a dootrine of final causality inevitably 
leads. Even to the materialistio Santayana the faot of teleOl-
ogy is observable in nature. But the aotual tendency or "blind 
disposition" is something intangible. Can Santayana explain 
this intangible thing with his materiali~? It seems that in 
this instanoe he would have to relinquish his materiali~ as 
the "pre-supposition of oonventional sanity.n42 The same diffi-
culty is encountered in the theory of cognition. Santayana rec-
ognizes that only an immaterial faoulty (for him the "spirit,"), 
is oapable of the spiritual operation of knowing. Still, as in 
the case of teleology, he does not want to say that this tmma-
terial or spiritual operation flows ultimately fram an immateri-
al prinoiple. For this reason he enunoiates the prinoiple that 
nothing oan be learned of the nature of an agent from its ao-
tion; or, to put it into the words in whioh he expresses it ~n 
Soeptioism and Animal Faith: "The only behavior that oan give 
proof of thinking is thinking itself."43 Here one enoounters 
the two elements of Santayana's philosophy. The thinking person 
is tangible, visible, and, in Santayana's eyes, material. Since 
it is the person who thinks, it is understandable why he says 
42 Schilpp, 17. 
43 Soepticism, 243. 
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that matter is the only power, the only force in the world.44 
But the actual thinking is not material; it is spiritual. In 
his explanation of cognition santayana must fall back on the 
person, the material thing, and relegate to the imagination 
whatever explanation may be had of the epiphenomenal, immaterial 
element. This lies behind Santayanats distinction between tele-
ology, a faot present in the world, and final causes, which, as 
the sources of this intangible tendency, this "blind disposi-
tion," he styles "mythical and created by a sort of literary i1-
lusion."45 
The consequenoe of this understanding of finality is that 
the "summum bonum" of Plato and the God of the Christian, as 
final causes, become figments of the imagination. This is the 
second faotor involved in his doctrine of teleology, to whioh 
the first faotor is reducible, beoause it appears that Santayana 
rejects finality, not so muoh because of his materialism as for 
fear of the consequences of the doctrine. Santayana himself 
bears witness to mankind's long-standing oonviotion that final-
ity is linked with theology. 
In either case, after making our bow to 
this divine will, out of deference to antiq-
uity and human rhetoric, we should be re-
duced to studying as far as possible the 
crawling prooesses of nature. These will 
44 Sohilpp, 509. 
45 Matter, 323. 
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be the seat of such teleology as surely 
exists, and as a critical philosophy may 
record withQut falling into rhetorical am-
biguities.46 
• 
And 1s not materialism a philosophy utterly incompatible with 
30 
theology? Santayana's chosen faith is not religious: "Santa-
yana's faith is, as always, in naturalism, not as a logical 
sine gua non, but as the only possible interpretation of exper-
ienceo"47 
But if materialism rejects all causality save that of the 
efficient cause, can not theology still be preserved by effi-
cient causality? The only reasonable conclusion Santayana's 
reader can draw is that "chance, matter, fate---some non-spirit-
ual principle or other,,48 is accountable for the universe. Ac-
tually, it is difficult to visualize preoisely what Santayana 
intends, when passages such as the following occur frequently: 
It is sheer ignoranoe to stare at any-
thing as if it were inexplicable and self-
created, a mere intruder in the world. 
The universe itself no doubt !B ground-
less and a perpetual miracle. 
His treatment of the order manJest in the universe is simi1ar. 50 
First he speaks of a continuous flux, of the "blind course of 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
Ibid., 316-317. 
Howgate, 110-111. 
scerticism, 285. 
Mat er, 224. ' 
Ibid., 306. 
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cosmic events,n5l which, however inexplicable, seems to show 
some signs of order.52 In spite of his espousal of chance, of 
absolute spontaneity, he finds that "the seasons return, their 
fruits varying with the weather; the generations repeat them-
selves ••• ,,53 Moreover, though he attributes a teleological 
function to external conditions to the extent of practically 
denying it to the body subjected to these conditions, he dis-
covers a marvelous precision and timeliness in the growth of 
an embryo,54 and the bloom of consciousness only in "certain 
predetermined classes and intensities of sensation.,,55 
Contrary also, to his absolute chance is another fruit of 
his materialism, his mechanism, which is not one principle of 
explanation among others, but "is explanation itself.,,56 To 
divine a mechanism is to observe a recurrence, to fathom a 
trope.57 In Santayana's terminology a trope is a name given 
to the essence of any event as distinguished fram that event 
itself, such as today's sunrise as distinguished from yester-
daY's.58 A trope, then is an expression of that order in the 
world which is Santayana's daily experience, although philo-
51 Truth, 451. 
52 Matter, 316. 
53 !bld., 228. 
54 !"6'lQ., 353. 
55 ma., 346. 
56 Reason in Common Sense, 17. 
57 Edlrian, 283. 
56 Matter, 293, 294. 
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sophically he espouses absolute chance. Truly he says .that the 
entire universe is a perpetual miracle. 59 From this it is 
clear why Santayana's philosophy is not a pure materialism, 
since the deterministic nature of materialism is incompatible 
with his indeter.mini~. 
Man is of a piece with the rest of creation, and Santayana 
claims that he discerns the same mechanism, the same material 
forces, even behind man's love and loftiest ambitions. 50 But 
is not mechanism oontrary to free will? Assuredly. Then how 
oan Santayana acoount for his own experience? Did he not say: 
When people feel a power of origination 
and decision within them, so that, un-
less externally hindered, they are free 
to do whatever they will, undoubtedly 
they are not deceived~5l 
Now santayana is faithful to his experience, and must have re-
course to his fundamental materialistio supposition to explain 
this experienoe. 
It is an obsoure, complex, groping move-
ment of the psyohe, or of many psyches 
in oontaot: it is a perpetual readjust-
ment of passionate habits of matter. 52 
Santayana gives the example of a man with a parohed throat, 
who desires water beoause he is thirsty.53 Since it is a 
59 Ibid., 224. 
50 !aiiiin, 287. 
51 Matter, 355. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid., 313. 
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bodily need that craves satisfaction, Santayana concludes that 
• 
the will is a habit of matter. As material, it seems that the 
will must desire material goods. But Santayana does not so con-
clude, for he admits that the will can desire immaterial goods: 
honor, beauty, love, etc. Just as in the process of cognition 
he denies an immaterial principle for the immaterial "spirit" 
which knows, so he consistently denies an immaterial will which 
desires immaterial goods. Could it be that because of his 
materialistic supposition, he is unwilling to designate man a 
composit.e being, constituted of both material and immaterial 
principles? The need of an immaterial principle is not, as is 
commonly supposed among materialists, an a priori religious be~ 
lief, but an essential philosophical principle, necessary to 
explain the difference between stones, dogs and men. 
In conclusion it can be said that Santayana's fundamental 
difficulty is to reconcile his poetry and his materialism. As 
a poet he can not renounce the significance of man's spiritual 
gifts, and as a materialist, he can not deny the physical origi 
of these gifts. His creed is expressed succinctly: 
While the existence of things must be 
understood by referring them to their 
causes, which are mechanical, their 
functions· can only be explained by what 
is interesting in their results, in 
other words, by their rela~ion to human 
nature and to human happiness. 54 
64 Interpretation of Poetry and Religion, 91. 
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Indeed, it requires a unique theory of causalty to demonstrate 
~ 
the oonsequence of the spiritual oomponent of human nature and 
human happiness from a material principle. A reasonable ex-
planation of mind is impossible for a materialistio philosophy. 
The Platonic element in Santayana's philosophy ought to have 
provided him with oopious spiritual entities; but it had a 
disadvantage which did not acorue to materialism, that of lead-
ing to the Platonic "summum b~num". The connotations of that 
Idea were too much for Santayana, and aocordingly he renounoed 
Catho1icism in favor .ot naturallsm. 65 
65 Howgate, 46. 
CHAPTER III 
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS 
OF TRANSCENDENTAL MAT'ERIALISM 
The critical problem lies at the root of Santayana's tran-
scendental materialism. His materialistic pre-supposition ren-
ders difficult a rational explanation of an immaterial mind. 
Hence, an even greater insight into Santayana's pOSition can be 
gained by examining his idea of the nature of man, the knowing 
being, and illustrate his concept of the manner in which man 
knows. 
Fundamental to Santayana's psychology is a material 
"psyche," the "self-maintaining and reproducing pattern or 
structure of an organism, conceived as a power."l The actual 
form of an organism, such as a plant, hides a power capable of 
maintaining or restoring that form. This potentiality, Which 
is often concentrated in a seed, dwells in the matter of the 
organism, but in a manner cloaked in mystery, "so that for ob-
servation the form itself seems to be a power (when locked in 
that sort of substance or seed) and to work towards its own 
manifestation."2 This psyche, in its moral unity, "is a poetic 
or mythological notion, but is needed to mark the hereditary 
vehement movement in organisms towards specific forms and 
1 ,irit, 15. 
2 lid. 
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functions. n3 • 
This last description of the psyche by Santayana can not 
be read without evoking a question mark. How can this "hered-
itary movement" towards specific forms be reconciled with the 
absolute potentiality Santayana attributes to every seed, Which 
is capable of varying its specific form according to the condi-
tions which foster it?4 The very teleology Which, in the pre-
vious chapter, Santayana styled a "mock explanation" is no 
longer ludicrous. The "blind disposition" there depicted now 
enters in in the guise of the psyche. 5 
Another point to be noted in connection with Santayana's 
description of the psyche quoted above is its "moral unity". 
Why does Santayana call this moral unity a "poetiC notion?" Is 
there anything in Santayana's own experience to deny the real-
ity of this moral unity, this acting as a unit? There seems 
to be only one satisfactory answer to this query: that Santa-
yana realized the insufficiency of his materialism to explain 
3 Ibid., 15. 
4 Ditter, 289-290. 
5 Supra, 26-27. The task of interpreting Santayana is no easy 
one. In The Rea1m of Spirit he speaks Of this power as 
"often concentrated in a seed." (Slirit, 15.) In The Rea1m 
of Matter he flatly contradicts th s assertion. 
The mysterious potentiality packed in 
the seed would, then, not be internal 
to it, or due to a speCially wonderful 
essence therein embodied. 
-- The Rea1m of Matter, 289-290. 
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the unity of action in human beings. Of itself matter Foes not 
act as a unit. To state that this matter has an innate disposi-
tion for adhesion not only begs the question, but also indi-
cates that something besides matter is required. In his treat-
ment of the spirit, Santayana furnishes abundant evidence for 
the discrete nature of matter. Happiness is found when the 
spirit attains its transcendental throne, and establishes it-
self in equilibrium amidst diverse material demands. 6 More-
over, what would Santayana say of experience, which, in its own 
admirable fashion, teaches every man that the material organs 
of his own body are in constant antagonism unless something is 
present to harmonize them? Did a man's stomach ever cease from 
craving for food because it realized that it was making the man 
sick? 
Santayana is logica~ then, in attributing only moral unity 
to the material psyche, and denying to it any real or metaphys-
ical unity. 
In saying this I am far from wishing to 
attribute a metaphysical fixity or unity 
to the psyche, or to claim for my own 
person an absolute Singleness and con-
sistency. Some passive drifting and 
some fundamental vagueness there must 
be in every animal mind; and the best-
knit psyche still participates in the 
indefinite flux of matter, is self-for-
getful in part, and is mortal.? 
6 Cf. Spirit, 262. 
? Schilpp, 25. 
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santayana explains the psyche as the source of the spirit, and, 
• 
therefore, the source of all spiritual functions, such as con-
sciousness. This psyche "participates in the indefinite flux 
of matter," and probably does so in the same way as our material 
bodies participate, by undergoing, as the biologists say, a 
change every seven years. Now if this psyche is changing, cer-
tainly its spiritttal function must also change. The problem of 
memory, then, as well as each man's consciousness that he is 
the same person wbo lived seven, ten, or twenty years ago, be-
comes insoluble. Hence it is understandable why Santayana de-
nies to his person "an absolute singleness and consistency." 
But is he not also denying the cammon conviction of all mankind, 
that a man remains the same even though his material body is 
undergoing constant change, a conviction, indeed, which forms 
the basis for the sanctions of law? Once again it seems that 
Santayana must forfeit his materialism for the sake of sanity, 
rather than posit materialism for sanity's sake. 
santayana acknowled@es that he borrowed the ter.m "psyche" 
from Aristotle; but his "psyche" is nota "form" in the Aris-
totelian sense. Aristotle's "psyche" is the form of the body, 
the intelligible element of a composite being. Santayana's 
"psyche," on the contrary, is "this self of mine," the "active 
and passionate" man Which each one of us perceives himself to 
be. It ~s the self which is "a principle of steady life"; the 
self' which "slumbers and breathes below, a mysterious natural 
"....-
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organism, full of dark yet definite potentialities. n8 There is 
.. 
a world of difference between the two, sinoe the Aristotelian 
form is the intelligible element of a oomposite, while very 
little is known about Santayana's psyche. Apparently all that 
santayana oan say about the inner oonstitution of this psyohe 
is that it is material; yet not a substance or an atom, but a 
mode of substanoe, or, in other terms, a definite organization 
of matter. 9 This materialistio explanation of man's psyohe 
seems to result fram Santayana's conclusion that since compos-
ite beings depend upon matter, a material principle must be 
their only principle. lO 
Why is it that Santayana knows so little about the psyche? 
He answers in Soeptioism and Animal Faith: 
I must discard at onoe, as inoompatible 
with the least oritioism, the notion 
that nature or oertain parts of nature 
are known to be animatel~eoause they 
behave in oertain ways. 
In other words Santayana would say that the observation of any 
operation informs the speotator that such an action is capable 
of being performed by the operator, and tells the spectator 
nothing about the nature of the operator. For eXRmple, the ex-
ponent of this position would logioally be forced to say: 
8 soeEticism, 148-149. 
9 Mat er, 332. 
10 Supra, 23. 
11 Sceptioism, 243. 
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"If the dog runs, he runs;tt and not, "If the dog runs, he is a 
• 
living being. tt But does not santayana himself say that con-
sciousness and cognition are functions of the spirit, and there-
fore immaterial? To be consistent with himself, then, he must 
not call the psyche material when he observes only spiritual 
operations. Rather than have recourse to his basic pre-supposi-
tion, materialism, he should at most profess the agnosticism he 
admits elsewhere. 
I cannot hope to discover, therefore, 
what precisely this psyche is, this 
self of mine, the existence of which 
is so indubitable i% my active and 
passionate nature. 
If operations tell him nothing of the nature of the oper-
ator, then Santayana's psychology must be behavioristic. Ac-
tually he does consider behavioristic, or, as he sometimes says, 
biological psyChology,13 as the only scientific pSYChology;14 
for the scientific psychologist is bound to the observation of 
physical facts, of material events.15 If the object of this 
scientific knowledge is only the operations of the psyche, 
Santayana rightfully concludes that he does not know "this self 
of mine," because he knows only his activities. To this can be 
traced the reason for one of his fundamental dogmas, his own ex-
12 Ibid., 148-149. 
13 tetter of June 15, 194? 
14 Scepticism, 251; Spirit, 282. 
15 Scepticism, 257. 
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istence,16 "which is so indubitable to my active and ~ssionate 
nature," and yet undemonstrable by his materialistic psychol-
ogy.l? 
Since the scientific psychologist examines physical facts 
or material events, how does Santayana classify the other mani-
festations of his "active and passionate nature?" To literary 
psychology, the art of imagining how animals feel and think,lS 
belong "sensuous images, memories, lyric effusions, and dramatic 
myths. ,,19 Santayana remarks that even the simplest perception 
of scientific psychology has present in it an element which 
only poetry can desoribe or sympathy conceive. In scientific 
psychology are involved words, actions and attitudes. 20 But 
these words, actions and attitudes are not the understanding of 
the words, nor the sense of the attitudes and actions. Clearly, 
Santayana conceives the necessity of a mind to interpret these 
data of scientific psychology. But since he has declared that 
actions are not indicative of the nature of the thing acting, 
he must rely on the fallible imagination to conjure up an inter 
16 Ibid., 243. 
I? ~reasonably questions this use of the term. "psychology". 
Santayana borrowed the Greek tem "psyche"; but of what 
profit is it to speak of ttscientific psychology" when this 
science can produce no information about the ttpsyche," but 
only catalogue its activities, which are powerless to 
reveal its nature? 
IS scetticism, 252. 
19 Mat er, 315. 
20 Scepticism, 252. 
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pretation. An example might olarify this point. Were ~anta­
yana to see a man with flushed oountenanoe vio1ently waving his 
arms, and addressing his ferooity to another man, Santayana 
could only olassify the activities as given in the desoription. 
He could not say that the symptoms indicated anger, or that the 
language betrayed the human nature of the agent. He might im-
agine that this is the oase. But surely if the angry man were 
to address himself to Mr. Santayana, Santayana would forget his 
materialistio "pre-supposition of oonventional sanity," and ao-
knowledge that it is not a case of imagination, but an incon-
trovertible, reasonable fact. 
It seems olear that Santayana's materialism is a factor in 
his preferenoe for the imagination. It is the materialist voic-
ing the opinion that "there is no suoh thing as mental sub-
stanoe, mental foroe, mental maohinery, or mental oausation."2l 
By this Santayana does not intend to deny the immateriality of 
mental faots, but only a spiritual souroe for mental reality. 
Substanoe, in diversifying the field of 
nature, sometimes takes the form of ani-
mals in whom there are feelings, images, 
and thoughts~ These mental faots are 
immaterial.2~ 
Could this be an instanoe of Santayana's oentering his whole at-
tention upon the material oonoomitant, and thus upon only half 
of the faots? 
21 Matter, 380. 
22 Ibid., 233. 
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The important point to grasp is that this assertioJl of men-
tal or spiritual reality without a source of the same nature is 
the basis for Santayana's dichotomY between transcendentalism 
and his materialism. Santayana himself equivalently admits 
this fact: 
He (man) constantly exerts power, some-
times visibly by bodily acts; but often 
the physical souroes of his power are 
hidden from his mind, or not attended 
to, and he attributes his action to his 
ideas. But his ideas have no place in 
the traoeable sequence of material events; 
they brood over that flux like the ~R­
visible gods or the laws of nature. 
Since "ideas have no place in the traceable sequence of mater-
ial events," they have no place in Santayana's scientific psy-
chology. For this reason Santayana must have recourse to the 
imagination for a psychology of ideas. ~d sinoe ideas merely 
"brood over that flux," they exert no influence on material 
events. Thus Santayana denies all final causality to ideas, 
and places an insurmountable barrier between mind and matter, 
between his transcendentalism and materialism. 
Santayana's effort to surmount this barrier involves him 
in an unusual problem of causality. How does the material psy-
che generate the knowing, immaterial spirit? In Aristotelian 
terminology, says Santayana,24 the psyohe is a physical potency, 
23 Spirit, 280-281. 
24 Letter of April 16, 1947. 
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a material entity existing in potency. Spirit is the a~t of 
this potency: it is the "existens in actu". In an effort to 
clarify this generation of the spirit, Santayana was asked if it 
were not true that Aristotle himself would demand a proportion 
between a potency and its act, since a "potency" signifies 
"capability for an act", and a definite potency is specified by 
its act. 25 $antayana replied: 
Your difficulties in understanding my 
philosophy do not surprise me, and I 
think they are insurmountable as long 
as you reason on Scholastic axiom~6 
such as nihil dat quod non habet. 
In concrete ter.minology Santayana's reply would mean that it is 
possible to obtain a cow fram an acorn. Santayana continued: 
Since the 'quod' or 'quid' is defined 
as an essence---nothing existent is de-
finable---the system of the world be27 comes entirely a system of essences. 
Yet if nothing existent is definable, but only essences, which 
are logical or ideal terms, then Santayana's philosophy is en-
tirely in the ideal order. 
But he realizes that a purely ideal philosophy, a pure 
transoendentalism, ·is utterly divorced from external reality. 
In order to remain faithful to his experience of an existing re-
ality external to himself, Santayana posits his materialism to 
25 A letter to Santayana by the author. 
26 Letter of June 15, 1947. 
27 ill!. . 
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explain this external reality. But since "nothing exi§tent is 
definable," this materialism is actually incapable of afford-
ing any real explanation. Thus his materialism remains a "pre-
supposition of conventional sanity," and the "facts" that it is 
designed to explain are "brute facts" Which any man loyal to 
his experience can not deny. For example, Santayana is con-
strained "merely to register as a brute fact the emergence of 
consciousness in animal bodies."28 Does Santayana offer any 
explanation of this brute fact? In The Rea~ of Truth he 
states that consciousness is due to certain tropes or cycles 
fixed in matter, or in other words, to material organization. 29 
Undoubtedly it is true that living beings are highly organized, 
but can mere material organization explain their life? Most 
probably Santayana would consider this to be a biological, not 
a philosophical problem. But it does not seem fair to accept 
as a philosophical fact a highly-disputed biological opinion, 
however well it may accord with a materialistio philosophy. 
Amterialism or material organization might, with an equal de-
gree of intellectual honesty, be rejected as an explanation of 
life on the scientific data of such renouned biologists as 
Driesch, McDougall, Carrel, and other Vitalists. Moreover, a 
philosopher ought not to rest content with "material organiza-
tion" as an explanation, because certainly he will be asked 
28 Schilpp, 17-18. 
29 Truth, 516-517. 
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whence comes this organization. Not only, then, does Santa-
• 
,ana's transcendentalism, in which only essences are definable, 
prevent him fram explaining anything existent; but also the very 
materialism which he has invoked to explain reality utterly 
fails to supply a convinoing, ultimate explanation. This fail-
ure to explain adequately has led us to characterize Santa-
yana's philosophy as description,30 since both elements of man, 
the material and the tmmaterial are represented, though without 
sufficient justifioation, in transoendental materialism. 
The irreconcilable dichotomy between transcendentalism and 
materialism is echoed in the cleavage between Santayana's liter-
ary and scientifio psychology. Subjective data, Santayana ad-
mits, may be signs of powers at work, but they are "the insub-
stantial fabrio of a vision."3l Any attempt to investigate the 
nature of these signs, or a fortiori, these powers, belongs to 
literary psyohology, to the imaginative faoulty, and oonse-
quently are mental constructions. Although his scientifio or 
behavioristic psychology, the fruit of his materialism, is lim-
ited to the olassification 'of material events, it is incapable 
of rendering an explanation of the psyche, sinoe an operation is 
not indicative of the nature of its principle. Ib~eover, 
Santayana refuses to examine the psyche because the analysis of 
substanoe, whioh he holds to be material, belongs to the physi-
30 Supra, 23. 
31 Letter of April 16, 1947. 
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cist, not to the metaphysician. 32 As a result of this.dichot-
omy Santayana speaks of reason as "matter organized, and assum-
ing a form at once distinctive, plastic, and opportune;"33 
while the life of reason, as he conceives it, 
is a mere romance, and the life of nature 
a mere fable; such pictures have no meta-
physical value, even if as sympathetic 
fictione they had some psychological 
truth. 34 
From Santayana's theory of knowledge flows his transcen-
dental materialism. As a Critical Realist, santayana postu-
lates the necessity of something or other to bridge the gap be-
tween the external world and the knowing subject's mind. Some 
philosophers style this medium a concept, a representation of 
the existing object. Santayana prefers the ter.m "datum," which 
he defines as "a theme of attention, a term in passing thought, 
a visioned universal."35 To t~ datum Santayana attaches the 
name of "essence". He himself describes this as a universal 
••• which may be given immediately, whether 
to sense or to thought. Only universals 
have logical or aesthetic individuali~y, 
or can be given directly, clearly, and 
all at once. When Aristotle said that the 
senses gave the particular, he doubtless 
meant by the senses the complete fighting 
sensibility of animals, with the reactive 
instinct and sagacity which posits a ma-
32 Letter of June 15, 1947. 
33 Schilpp, 24. 
34 sceaticiam, 101. 
35 Ibl., 54-55. 
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terial object and places it in its exter-
nal relations, here, now, and in such a 
quarter. But the senses as understood by 
modern idealism suggest rather a passive 
consciousness of some aesthetic datum, 
and this (which I call intuition) can 
never find anything but an ideal individ-
ual, which being individuated only by its 
intrinSiC quality, not by any external or 
dynamic relations (since none are given, 
i.e., existence, origin, date, place, 
substance, function and duration) is also 
a universal. This object of pure sense 
or pure thought, with no belief superadded, 
an objeot inwardly complete and individual, 
but without ext~rnal relations or B~ysical 
status, is what I call an essence. 
• 
The role an essenoe plays in Santayana's theory of cognition is 
that of a stepping-stone between two leaps. The ttleap of intui-
tion, from the state of the living organism to the conscious-
ness of some essence,"37 is followed by the "leap of faith and 
aotion, from the symbol actually given in sense or in thought 
to some ulterior existing object. tt38 
We have seen that according to Santayana the material psy-
che in its act of transcendence generates spirit. The essence 
which is the object of the spirit's intuition is a symbol, an 
ideal, non-existent term, a mere possibility which exists in th 
mind. 39 How does this essence become the object of the spirit's 
36 George Santayana, "Three Proofs of Realism," in Essays in 
Critical Realism: A Co-operative Stud, of the Problem of 
KnOWled~e, 163-184, Peter smith, New ork, 1941, 168. 
37 Ibid. ,83. 
38 IDid'. 
39 ~er of April 16, 1947. 
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eye? To this question Santayana would answer that it was 
aroused by an external stimulus. He illustrates with a butter-
cup.40 A buttercup present to the eye calls up the essence or 
the name of "yellow." This essence is not a particular, but a 
universal term of perception, which is given only when atten-
tion is stretched to the thing, that is, when the buttercup 
evokes the term. Santayana emphatically states that this es-
sence is not abstracted fram the buttercup; and that in this 
intuition the mind foouses the essence "yellow," and not the 
buttercup.4l This latter point sharply differentiates Santa-
yana t S "reaJmof essence" from Aristotle t s "realm of concepts," 
although Santayana says that the two have this in common: that 
both are realms o~ possible beings, not yet existing, but capa-
ble of existence.42 The intrinsically and inalienably e~ernal 
and universal nature of Santayana's essence is patently sugges-
tive of the Platonic Idea.43 But Santayana believes Platonic 
Ideas to be prototypes only of things existing in our present 
cosmos. The realm of essence is, however, absolute, taking in 
all possible worlds; and as for Leibniz, so for Santayana, God 
must have chosen this particular world because it was the 
40 sce~ticism, 94. 
41 Tm h. 438. 
42 Terence O'Connor, O.S.M., An account of interviews with 
Santayana, sent to the author in a letter of Apr. 16, 1947. 
43 Essence, 120. 
44 best. 
50 
Since an essence is, then, but a name, a logical ter.m 
called forth by a stimulus---a doctrine which suggests Santa-
yana's indebtedness to Locke and Berkeley---intuition must be of 
names, not of things.45 But if a definite essence is evoked by 
a definite stimulus, there must be some connection between this 
essence and this stimulus; otherwise, how would this particular 
essence become the object of intuition? The stimulus, there-
fore, must be examined to account for the occurrence in the mind 
of this particular essence. 
This introduces the second leap involved in cognition, the 
leap of faith and action. This is the act of transcendenoe 
which has previously been described: in which the material psy-
che, in searching for the source of the stimulus, must tran-
scend itself, thereby acquiring "a subjeotive spiritual acoom-
paniment,"46 so that the being perceives. The act of inoip-
ient transcendence, or the searching out for the stimulus in 
its source, involves expectation or anticipation of something 
out there. This anticipation or watchfulness is called "animal 
faith. ft Knowledge, says Santayana, consists in sensation, 
44 Letter of April 16, 1947. Infra., 67 et sq. for Santa-
yana's idea of God. Apparently Santayana has forgotten 
that "chance, matter, fate--- some non-spiritual principle 
or otherft is aocountable for the universe. Supra, 36. 
Essence, 35; scetticism, 188. 
Letter of Apr!l 6, 1947. 
45 
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animal faith, and the act of transcendence, or rather, 7hat as-
pires to be knowledge. If the source of the sttmulus is found, 
actual knowledge is had. 
Knowledge thus understood involves a cla~ or belief, 
since "the given essence will be the essence of the object 
meant," or, I "instinctively affirm it to be the essence of an 
existence confronting me. ,,47 But on what grounds is this af-
firmation made? In the example of the buttercup, Santayana 
said that the essence of yellow was perceived. But if this es-
sence is only a name, what reason is there for attributing it 
to the buttercup, since yellow says yellow, and not buttercup? 
Is there another essence called buttercup? Another example 
'might clarify the problem. The object of an intuition is the 
essence "rose", a universal term which might apply to any rose, 
red or white. Supposing this to be the case, the essence "rose 
which is the object of the intuition would not give any par-
ticular knowledge of the red rose which is actually before the 
knower. If the essence "red" should appear, then it would seem 
that there is something peculiar to the actual rose which would 
make "red" appear and not "white". The problem becomes further 
complicated when several objects are encountered in experience, 
as when a person takes a comprehensive view of the whole gar-
den, with a host of variegated flowers and other objects. 
47 Scepticism, 107. 
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Clearly, a multitude of essences would stream into conscious-
.. 
ness. Vfuat reason exists for assigning the "red" to a rose, 
"green" to leaves, etc:? If essences are merely ideal or es-
thetic terms, there is no reason why one person's identifica-
tion of certain terms with certain objects of experience should 
agree with another's. This is certainly true in the case of the 
provincial name "prairie dog" for "coyote". If essences are 
names, then there should be two objects of knowledge, but in re-
ality there is only one. And if essences are the objects of 
knowledge, then how would two men intuiting these different es-
sences know that they actually do see the same object? Even 
Santayana seems at ttmes to realize this, for he says elsewhere: 
"But it is events, in natural knowledge, that are the true ob-
jects; and the given essences are only the terms in which those 
events are described."48 The same idea is conveyed in somewhat 
different terms in SceptiCism and Animal Faith. 
Thus scientifio psychology confirms 
the criticism of knowledge and the ex-
perience of life which proclaim that 
the immediate objects of intuition are 
mere appearances,. and that nothing 
given exists as lt is given.49 
But so long as essences, mere names or descriptive terms of 
events or appearances, remain the data of intuition, Santayana 
oan not logically assert that he knows an event or an appear-
48 Essence, 166. 
49 SceptiCism, 66. 
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ance. 
• 
Santayana's last phrase, "that nothing given exists as it 
is given," reminds us of the Lockian idea that secondary quali-
ties do not exist in the object, but are the subject's reaction 
to that object. Santayana's statement is, however, not re-
stricted to secondary qualities; it includes primary qualities 
such as extension and resistance as well. But if e:;tension and 
other primary qualities do not exist in the object, one stands 
on the verge of absolute scepticism. 
In The Realm of Matter Santayana speaks of ideas as "the 
forms which things wear in human experience,n50 indicating that 
he intends "essence" to Signify the actual appearanoe of an ob-
ject, and not just a name for that appearanoe. These different 
appearances will lead, he says, to an underlying substance 
whioh can be the butt for action.51 But since operations are 
wholly unindioative of the nature of the operator, Santayana's 
appearances can tell him nothing of the nature of this sub-
stance. Consequently, here again he relies on his fundamental 
"pre-supposition" for an explanation of that substanoe, namely 
matter. 
It seems that many of the difficulties whioh beset Santa-
yana's doctrine of essence would be resolved if he were to 
50 Matter, 223. 
51 Ibid., 
-
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center knowledge in an external objeot, and not in an essenoe. 
4 
ThUS he oould more resolutely state: "There is really a world, 
and there are real objeots in eaoh oase to be desoribed;n52 and 
would not have to terminate in the idealism expressed in a 
passage like this: 
Our ideas are acoordingly only subjeo-
tive signs, while we think them ob-jeotive qualities; and the whole warp 
and woof of our knowledge is rhetori-
oal while we think it physioally exi~­
tent and oonstitutive of the world. 5 
But in spite of Santayana's profession of a pure idealism, the 
majority of men have the oonviotion that they know things, 
things outside of themselves. True, they would admit with 
Santayana the subjeotive power of attention, and, by dint of in-
grained habit, subjeotive interpretation of external data. 54 
But to all appearanoes, unless the essenoesor data of intuition 
somehow belong to external objeots, man is eternally divoroed 
from any true knowledge of the external world. Even Santayana 
himself oomes to this conclusion: 
In regard to the original articles of 
the animal creed---that there is a 
world, that there isa future, that 
things sought oan be found, and things 
seen oan be eaten---no guarantee can 
possibly be offered. I am sure these 
dogmas are often false ••• 55 
From this can be understood Santayana's purpose in entitling 
52 Truth, 458. 
53 Ibid. 
54 ~er, 351. 
55 Sceptioism, 180. 
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the introductory volume to his mat~rer philosophical wqrks 
Scepticism and Animal Faith. Without doubt his scepticism has 
-
brought him to the point he thought: 
Let me then push scepticism as rar as I 
logically can, and endeavor to clear my 
mind or illusion, eveB6at the price or 
intellectual suicide. 
Despite intellectual hari-kari, Santayana's common sense 
argues ror the existence or material things57 and his own ex-
istence.58 However, ror Santayana, this existence is the rruit 
or animal faith, a conviction literally shocked into him. Of 
its very nature existence is mad. It is a blind flux, thought-
lessly running on, which "neither knows nor cares that it is 
making.,,59 
What is the origin or this concept? It has already been 
seen that the realm of essence is absolute, that essences are 
non-existent, and that God selected this particular world be-
cause it was the best. 60 Since everything could have been 
other than it actually is, or, in Santayana's terminology, 
since an essence is only accidentally the essence of an exist-
ing thing, Santayana calls the world "contingent".6l For him 
"contingent" means "accidental" or "by chance," so that he 
56 Ibid., 10. 
57 I'6'I(I ~, 145. 
58 I'6IQ., 141. 
59 Matter, 347-348; Scepticism, 16l-l62. 
60 Supra, 48. ( 
61 Letter of April 16, 1947. 
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seems to be forgetful of his statement that God selecte~ the 
world. If the world is~ntingent,n then Santayana is perfect-
lY logical in concluding that existence is irrational. 52 This 
1s a necessary consequence of his reduction of causation to a 
mere succession of one thing after another, because in mere suc-
cession there is no necessity.53 Existence is also irrational 
for Santayana in the sense that "nothing existent is de fin-
able,n64 so that the only explanation Santayana has for exist-
ence is his "pre-supposition," materialism. It still remains 
for Santayana to reconcile the irrational flux of existence, an 
expreSSion of his "absolute spontaneity" or indeterminism, with 
his mechanism. But Santayana will never answer any questions 
relative to existence: first, because it is irrational and due 
to chance; and secondly, because he never distinguishes exist-
ence from existents, and these belong to the phYSicist's in-
vestigation, not the metaphysician t s.65 
It is Santayana's theory of knowledge Which best eluci-
dates the dichotomy of his philosophy. Essences, as names, are 
mere words Which are the data known by the mind. If this is 
true, then Santayana can never arrive at that understanding of 
the words, which, he says, is totally different from the words 
52 Of.Scepticism, 208,284; Matter, 295-296, 305, 347-348. 
53 Supra, 24. 
54 Butra, 43. 
55 Le ter of April 16, 1947. 
themselves. 66 To interpret these ideal data, he must indulge 
• 
in literary psychology, in imaginative fancy. Since these 
eSsences are not, and never will be, "the essences of 
things,,,67 Santayana never can know existing things. But 
. 
common sense postulates something as the butt for action, so 
57 
that Santayana falls back for an explanation of this utterly 
unknowable thing on a "pre-supposition of conventional sanity," 
materialism. 
66 Scepticism, 252. 
67 Essence, 135-136. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE ETHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF 
TRANSCENDENTAL MATERIALISM 
T.he study of the dichotomy in Santayana's ethics and the-
ology will be of a different nature from that made of his psy-
chology and epistemology in the last chapter. "Psyche" and "ex-
istence" were found to be philosophical expressions of his 
materialism. "Essence," as an ideal or logical object of knowl-
edge, was discovered to be the fruit of a pure transcendental-
ism. "Spirit," however, straddles the fence. It is a term of 
Santayana's philosophical materialism as the fruition of a ma-
terial psyche; while at the same time it is ideal, in that it is 
the immaterial power of perception. Its ideal character is 
further emphasized by the fact that its investigation belongs to 
literary psychology, to the fancies of the imagination. Thus i 
the previous chapter Santayana's dichotomy was actually found in 
the philosophical terms of his own choosing, and in his develop-
ment of a dualism in a philosophy, as it were, of these very 
terms. In his ethics and theology, on the other hand, Santa-
yana's philosophical expression is materialistic. Matter is the 
root of morality and theology. A transcendental or idealistic 
element is to be found not in the terms, but in the goal of 
morality and theology, in the very ideal life of living in the 
mind. l 
1 Muelder-Sears, 190. 58 
59 
Santayana considers himself a moral philosopher, who bears 
.. 
the message that "morality and religion are expressions of hurna 
nature.,,2 This "human nature," however, is simply matter. At 
the root of morality lies the material psyohe as the ultimate 
power and souroe of life.3 This psyohe, aooording to Santayana, 
is so oonstituted that it aspires after good, and thereby "in-
troduoes the element of preferenoe, the distinotion between 
good and evil, suooess and failure,"4 Yet Santayana is oareful 
to point out in The Realm of Matter that the movement of nature 
can not be attributed to the anteoedent influenoe of the future 
good whioh she might realize. There is no real teleology based 
on a realization of ends. 
Instead, we must attribute the pursuit 
of this good, and its eventual realiza-
tion, to her previous blirid disposition, 
fortified by the faot that oiroumstgnoes 
were favorable to that development. 
Thus Santayana makes it quite olear that "the root of morality 
is animal bias,,;6 and that when he speaks of "good", he intends 
psyohologioal good, since he admits of no objective or ontolog-
ical good. 7 As a result Santayana's morality is strictly rela-
tive; good and evil are relative to the nature of animals, and 
2 Sohilpp, 23 • 
. 3 Spirit, 16; Persons and Plaoes, 244. 
4 Spirit, 242. 
5 Matter, 323. 
6 Truth, 483. 
7 Aooount of interviews in letter of April 16, 1947. 
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irreversible in that relation.8 For this doctrine Santayana 
.. 
says he is indebted to Spinoza, and he clafms that this is the 
cause of his enthusiasm for the Jewish philosopher. 9 
The logioal outoome of this theory of morality oan be seen 
in Santayana's ooncept of "value". For him "value" is a rela-
tive, and, therefore, a subjeotive thing: "a dignity which any-
thing may aoquire in view of the benefit or satisfaotion whioh 
it brings to some living being."lO Mr. Howgate believes that 
for Santayana satisfaotion is the very touoh-stone of value. 
We are now in a position to inquire what 
is the ultimate desideratum of the good 
life? Santayana's answer is brief---happi-
ness. 'Happiness is the only sanotion of 
life; where happiness fails, existenoe re-
mains a mad and lamentable experiment. ,11 
There is nothing shameful to him in ao-
knowledging pleasure as a oriterion of 
moral worth. Santayana's philosophy is 
a frank hedonism. 'The more pleasure a 
universe oan yield, other things being 
equal, the more benefioient and generous 
is its general nature; the more pains its 
oonstitution involves, the darker and more 
malign is its total temper ••• To deny that 
pleasure is a good and pain an evil is a 
grotesque affeotation.,12 It will be . 
notioed, however, that the pursuit of 
pleasure is not to be a mere selfish ,en-
terprise. The ideal is lost sight of 
8 Sohilpp, 10. 
9 Persons and Plaoes, 244. 
10 George Santayana, Platonism and The Spiritual Life, 
Chas. Soribner's Sons, New York, 1927, 3. 
11 Reason in Common Sense, 238. 
12 ibid., 54-55. 
'when a man cultivates his garden-
plot of private pleasures, leaving it 
to chance and barbarian fury to govern 
the state and quicken the world's 
passions.,~3 The happiness of the 
greatest number must be striven for ••• 14 
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A contradiction inherent in Santayana's philosophy becomes 
evident as one peruses this passage. Loyal to experience, 
santayana admits the altruistic tendenoy in mants nature. Yet, 
can this altruism be accounted for by a material psyche? The 
commonly experienced injunction of animal bias is to flee from 
the revolting sight and odor of leprosy. If animal bias is the 
criterion of value, why would a doctor and nurse consider their 
actions good and remain heroically at their postS? 
A material psyche as the root of morality raises another 
difficulty. It would seem from the very nature of a material 
potency, that if this physical potency is the ultimate crite-
rion of right and wrong, of good and evil, then physical, mate-
rial objects must be the ultimate right and wrong, good and 
evil. It remains, therefore, to be explained how men can de-
sire immaterial goods, such as honor and fame, and this fre-
quently in opposition to their desires for material goods, such 
as money or health. 
13 
14 
George Santayana, Reason in SCience, Chas. Scribner's 
Sons, New York, 1906, 270. 
Howgate, 116-117. 
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Santayana has strenuously rejected objective standardS of 
right and wrong.15 The individual's psyche, in its animal bias, 
furnishes these standards. The psyche, then, determines what 
actions are right and wrong. If a man's psyche determines that 
it is good to kill the man's enemy, then the killing is a good 
act. But is this in harmony with the general opinion of men? 
Men juqge that the sanctions of law are just, and are to be ap-
plied whether the criminal believes he did well or not. For 
santayana, the same psyche which is the prinoiple of morality is 
the principle of reason. Consequently, in this oase of killing, 
the psyche as the principle of reason would contradict the psy-
che as the principle of morality. Should Santayana argue that 
punishment for murder has for its purpose the redress of a wrong 
perpetrated on society, then men must revise their ideas on the 
just punishment of malefactors. Subjectively, or according to 
Santayana's norms, no real crime has been committed, so that so-
ciety can not justly demand retribution. In addition, can a 
subjective criterion of right and wrong afford a reasonable ex-
planation of the sense of guilt and shame that the majority of 
men experience when they, in the usual sense of the term, "do 
wrong"? Sinoe Santayana agrees with man's common experience of . 
oriminal actions, he must find another explanation for the crim-
inal nature of these actions. He states: "The phYSical terror 
of murder has made murder criminal ••• ,,16 But does reason oon-
15 ~irit, 234. 
letter 320 
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firm this explanation? Is the hardened, sadistio murderer free 
• from the guilt of his crime because his crime does not fill him 
with physioal terror, but gives him, rather, a thrilling sensa-
tion of pleasure? Is he innocent of any transgression of law? 
If so, penitentiaries and electric chairs are unjust. 
Santayana would probably objeot to this reduction of his 
individualized ethics to moral license and anarohy. Lest suoh 
chaos should result fram his theory, Santayana has imposed cer-
tain ohecks and balances.17 First, he recognizes in human 
nature a permanent core which tends to maintain uniformity in 
moral values. Secondly, the "blind dispositio~" of the psyohe 
must be direoted towards some end, sinoe Santayana says that a 
person's entire life must be oonsidered, the sum-total of his 
wants and aspirations, in the oonstruotion of an ideal. In ad-
dition, "a harmony and oo-operation of impulses should be oon-
oeived, leading to the maximum satisfaction possible in the 
whole oommunity of spirits affeoted by our action.,,18 In Ego-
tism and German Philosophy is expressed that harmony whioh is 
the aim of Santayana's philosophy of a good life. 
There is a steady human nature within 
us, whioh our moods and passions may 
wrong but oannot annul ••• There is no 
oategorioal imperative but only the 
operation of instinots and interests 
more or less subjeot to disoipline and 
17 Cf. Howgate, 115. 
18 Reason in Common Sense, 256. 
mutual adjustment. Our whole life is 
a compromise, an incipient loose har-
mony between the passions of the soul 
and the forces of nature, forces which 
likewise generate and protect the 
souls of other creatures, endowing them 
with powers of expression and self-
assertion comparable with our own, and 
with aims no le!s sweet and worthy in 
,their own eyes. 
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Although this is an admirable expression of Greek moral 
ideals, Santayana accomplishes this harmony at the cost of a 
compromise of his own philosophical principles. He speaks of 
the "permanent core of human nature" and "a steady human nature 
within us." In his system, where "chance" has superseded cau-
sality, is there room for a steady human nature, especially 
since the material psyche "still participates in the indefinite 
flux of matter?"20 He states that this "steady human nature" 
may be wronged by our moods and passions. certainly our moods 
and passions are spiritual products, and as such in Santayana's 
philosophy, stem from the material psyche. But if the psyohe 
or the self furnishes the norms for morality, it seems impossi-
ble to speak of a mood or a passion wronging our steady human 
nature. Besides, the operations of instinots and interests, as 
experience bears witness, does not always result in a mutual ad 
justment and harmony. The lioness' instinot of self-preserva-
tion is sacrifioed to her maternal instinct when she must defeId 
19 
20 
George Santayana, Egotism in German PhilOSO!h~, 
Chas. Scribner's Sons, New York, 1915, 167- ~. 
Schllpp, 26. 
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her oubs. This saorifioe results in the very opposite of har-
.. 
mony, her own destruotion. Another one of the oheoks whioh 
Santayana has elaborated to prevent his individualized ethios 
from running headlong into moral ohaos is the "ideal" towards 
whioh the "blind disposition" of the psyohe tends, the epitome 
of a person's wants and aspirations. Inriew of Santayana's re-
jeotion of finality, is it possible for this "ideal" to have 
any influenoe on the psyohe, for the movement of nature oan not 
be attributed "to the anteoedent influenoe of the future good 
whioh she might realize?"2l 
Moral truth, as Santayana oonoeives it, is also relative. 
It signifies, he asserts, "only oomplete, enlightened, ultimate 
sinoerity.,,22 Having abolished an objeotive standard of moral-
ity, Santayana is oonsistent when he rejeots an objeotive ori-
terion for the truth of morality. "But there. would seem to be 
no oonoeivable objeot or reality in referenoe to whioh any type 
of morality oould be oalled true. n23 
A materialistio ethio like Santayana'~with satisfaotion 
as the touoh-stone of value, oaters to the sensitive, the mater 
ial part of man's nature. However, Santayana ·himself realizes 
that man's oonsoienoe has invariably rebelled against the gro 
ing sensitive satisfaotion of materialism, and reverted in some 
21 Matter, 323. 
22 Truth, 484. 
23 Ibid., 4?4. 
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form or other to a cultus of the unseen. What kinship~has the 
soul with the eternal and the ideal, whereby it is saddened by 
the thought of death, and clings to the hope of some power that 
may make it permanent amid the surrounding flux? Santayana 
bluntly affirms: "I believe there is nothing immortal."24 Yet 
once again Santayana is found faithful to experience. Poet 
that he is, he continually senses the immortal stirrings of his 
own spirit. To meet this need of the soul, he supplies the no-
tion of ideal immortality. In it he reaches the very pinnacle 
of his idealism, a point far removed from his earth-bound ma-
terialism. 
Since the ideal has this perpetual per-
tinence to moral struggles, he who lives 
in the ideal and leaves it expressed in 
society or in art enjoys a double im-
mortality. The eternal has absorbed him 
while he lived, and when he is dead his 
influence brings others to the same ab-
sorption, making them, through that ideal 
identity with the best in him, reincarna-
tions and perennial seats of all in him 
which he could rationally hope to rescue 
rram destruction ••• By becoming the spec-
tator and confessor of his own death and 
of universal mutation, he will have iden-
tified himself with what is spiritual in 
all spirits and masterful in all appre-
hension; and so conceiving himself, he 25 
may truly feel and know that he iseternal. 
But this ideal immortality, by which a man vainly tries to de-
ceive himself that he is no longer of this world, is imagina-
24 SceptiCism, 271. 
25 George Santayana, Reason in Religion, Chas. Scribner's 
Sons, New York, 1905, 272-273. 
tive. That immortality for which man so ardently crave~ can 
not be so elusive and unsubstantial. Could the whole human 
race be deceived about the fulfillment of this innate desire? 
If something so elusive as ideal immortality were the goal of 
its longing, mankind would have long ago stifled this desire. 
67 
Further proof, if there be need of it, of the other-worldl 
character of Santayana's philosophy can be discovered in an in-
vestigation of what he has said about God and theology. It is 
well to indicate at the very outset that Santayana disclaims 
the name atheist, and resents Fr. ~~rtindale's appellation, 
"atheistic esthete".26 But can Santayana's materialism account 
for a God? 
"That God is a spirit, though the text be orthodox, has 
never been the popular belief, nor have theologians taken it 
seriously. ,,27 One might question this sweeping denial. It is 
apparent that Santayana is giving expression to his own stand 
on spiritual substances. Sinoe he considers spirit as a funo-
tion, the "aot" of matter, he recognizes that to be logical he 
must reduce God to ma'tter. But would not such a reduction de-
grade God? Even Santayana thinks so.28 Then he will reduce 
God to a name. A name for what? Santayana cushions the blow 
26 Letter of April 16, 1947. 
27 Spirit, 283. 
28 Ibid., 288-289. 
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out of his regard for the sensibilities and ratiooinations 
• 
of the majority of his fellow-men, and states, in his most ele-
gant style, that God is another name for matter. 
God then beoomes a poetio symbol for 
the maternal tenderness and the pater-
nal striotness of this wonderful world; 
the ways of God become the Bubject-
matter of physios. 29 
Since matter is the only power in the universe, if men insist 
that God, as Creator, is a Power, He can only be another name 
for matter. Men attribute the cosmos to God in the same manner 
that they attribute their aotions to their feelings; but in re-
ality it is their material psyohes which are at work. The dis-
pute, therefore, between theists and atheists is merely 
verbal. 30 
What is the reaotion of the ordinary Christian who reads 
the "General Review" of Realms of Being? In a glorious summa-
tion Santayana states that his treatment of the realms of being 
may be regarded as a reduction of Christian theology and spirit-
ual discipline to their seoret interior souroe. In the cosmos 
man is confronted by an irrationally existing actuality, matter, 
which the devout soul, says Santayana, can poetically oall God 
the Father, sinoe fram matter all things have their origin. 
And God the Son ••• ? 
Yet all things, aooording, to the Nioene 
29 Matter, 396-397. 
30 Spirit, 284. 
Creed, were perforce oreated through the 
Son; and this dogma which might seem un-
intelligible, becomes clear if we con-
sider that power could not possibly pro-
duce anything unless it borrowed same 
form from the realm of essence and im-
posed ~hat form on itself and on its 
works. 1 
.. 
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Thus God the Son is another name for the realm of essence. vVhen 
matter and form fuse and become actual, there arises on occasion 
a love and pursuit of the Good. This third dimension of re-
ality, Which Santayana calls "spirit," is, he claims, poetically 
denominated the Holy Ghost. 32 
Here again, in theology, Santayana's reader meets the basic 
"pre-supposition" of Santayana's philosophy, his materialism. 
Embodied in his espousal of chance in preference to a theory of 
finality is a refusal to explain God on any but a hypothetical 
or pre-suppositional basis. 
Yet Santayana himself has rebelled against his own natural-
ism. He is a nominal, but not a practicing, Catholic, agreeing, 
as he says, with his father and mother in viewing religion as 
formally a work of the imagination, a great fairy-tale of the 
conscience.33 What has been Santayana's reaction to this 
"fairy-tale?" 
For my Olvn part, I was quite sure that 
31 SEirit, in Realms of Being, 846. 
32 lid., 848. 
33 SOliIlpp, ? 
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life was not worth living; for if re-
ligion was false everything was worth-
less, and almost everything, if reli-
gion was true ••• I saw the same alter-
native between Catholicism and complete 
disillusion: but I was never afrai%40f 
disillusion, and I have chosen it. 
.. 
Can it be that Santayana is reaping the fruit of his material-
ism? None the less he seeks a refuge from this disillusion in 
the dream-world of the imagination. Religion takes on the mean-
ing of having another world to live in. 35 Again, materialism is 
lost in the safe harbor of idealism. Santayana was not, as 
Mr. Howgate points out,36 the first to try to find a substitute 
for religion in the imagination. W~tthew Arnold, Mill, Comte 
and others attempted the same thing before him. These men felt 
that religion and poetry supplied the same want, and that the 
pure religion of poetry was better calculated to ennoble the 
conduct than any belief respecting the unseen powers. Comte and 
Mill styled such a religion a "religion of humanity," and were 
firm believers in its effioacy to provide both ample spiritual 
satisfaction in this life, and an ideal li:fe of iImnortality in 
those who were to :follow them. 
Beoause of Santayana's reduction of God and religion to the 
realms of myth and fancy, Fr. Martindale has branded him an 
34 Ibid., 7-8. 
35 ruerder-Sears, "How Religion May Be an Embodiment o:f 
Reason," 461-464, 461. 
36 Howgate, 134. 
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"atheistio esthete". Santayana's atheism stems from his mater-
~ 
ialism, for "to ask for an effioient oause, to traoe baok a 
foroe or investigate origins, is to have already turned one's 
faoe in the direotion of matter and meohanioal laws.,,37 But 
this matter is utterly barren for philosophical speoulation, 
beoause, as Santayana admits, the universe is an unfinished ex-
periment. 
It has no ultimate or~otal nature, be-
oause it has no end. It embodies no 
formula or statable law ••• Vihat a day 
may bring forth is unoertain, unoertain 
even for God.38 
Faced with this stark irrationality, it is no wonder that 
Santayana's philosophy is pictorial. He can be found on the 
brink of despair, on the verge of that intelleotual suioide 
which he predicted for himself. But when he find himself thus 
confronting disaster, he completely rejects his materialism to 
take refuge in his idealism. 
By their mind, its scope, quality, and 
temper, we estimate men, for by the 
mind-only do we exist as men, and are 
more than so many storage-batteries 
for material energy. Let us therefore 
be frankly human. 39Let us be content to live in the mind. 
Thus the two elements of Santayana's dichotomy, his ideal-
ism and materialism, are not integrated to form one philosophy. 
37 Muelder-Sears, t~ow Thought is Practical," 458-460, 459. 
38 Genteel Tradition, 188. 
39 Ibid., 19o. 
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His idealism is a harbor from the irrationality of hi~ma­
terialism, while his materialism is posited for sanity's sake 
to oounteraot his idealism. Santayana's own osoillation be-
tween these two elements proves them to be irreoonoilable. 
CHAPrER V .. 
THE POETIC NATURE OF SANTAYANA'S PHILOSOPHY 
This final chapter has as its aim to give an over-all pic-
ture of Santayana's philosophy. In calling attention to the po-
etic nature of this philosophy in the very title of the chapter, 
it has not been the intention to convey the idea that Santayana 
chooses between the opposing elements of his dichotomy. In this 
respect Santayana is loyal to an ideal he has depicted in one of 
his poems: "And he who chooseth not hath chosen best."l But ac-
tually Santayana does make a choice, not, however, in. the specu-
lative, but in the practical order. For Santayana there is no 
question of a choice between a materialistic and an idealistic 
philosophy. He considers materialism to be the only philosoph-
ical answer, for "the whole transcendental philosophy, if made 
ultimate, is false, and nothing but a private perspective."2 
But in the problem of living every-day life, as has been seen in 
the previous chapter, the materialistic "pre-supposition of con-
ventional sanity"3 is lost in the glittering splendor of life in 
the mind, in the realm of essence. Undoubtedly this choice in 
1 George Santayana, "In Grantchester Meadows," A Hermit of 
carmel! and Other Poems, Chas. Scribner's Sons, New York, 
1901, 14-115. 
2 Egotism in German Philosophy, 167. 
3 schi1pp, 17. 
'13 
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practical li~e, i~ this life in the mind may be called~racti­
cal,underlies one critic's centering upon "essence" as the key-
stone of Santayana's philosophy.4 The importance of this 
choice of Santayana's can not be over-emphasized. For to re-
alize'that Santayana is a poet living constantly in the pres-
ence of essences, ideal or aesthetic terms, facilitates the 
understanding of the otherworldly element o~ his philosophy. 
. I 
Moreover, though the poet is absorbed in the contemplation o~ 
~or.ms, which, as universals, are immutable and'eternal, he re-
alizes that, as a man subject himsel~ to the winds o~ change, 
who encounters constantly changing and ephemeral objects, he 
must exist simultaneously in a ~luid, material world ••• Even 
these perpetually-moving material objects somehow exemplify 
eternal essences or characters. 5 Here, once again, Santayana's 
materialism and idealism come together and mix, but never gel. 
At the root of Santayana's philosophy, in which these two 
elements so strangely entwine, is his poetry. As a philosopher 
Se.ntayana enunciates his concept of wisdom, a concept charged 
with his poetic genius, in the expression o~ which can be found 
an apt summation o~ this thesis. It is wisdom's part "to dream 
with one eye open; to be detached fram the world without being 
4 
5 
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hostile to it; to welcome fugitive beauties and pity fygitive 
sufferings, without forgetting for a moment how fugitive they 
are.n6 The materials of this dream are essences. But since 
Santayana can not completely divorce himself fram common sense, 
he keeps "one eye open" on the realm of existence, on the realm. 
of matter. 
It is disconcerting to discover what little certitude 
Santayana wishes to attach to his theories. First he asserts 
that he has 
absolute assurance of nothing save of 
the character of some given essence; 
the rest is arbitrary belief or inter-
pretation added by my animal im~ulse. 
The obvious leaves me helpless. 
But the philosophical inquirer is even more non-plussed when 
he considers the "given essence." 
'And all that you yourself have written, 
here and elsewhere, about essence, is it 
not true?' No, I reply, it is not true, 
nor meant to be true. It is a grammati-
calor possibly a poetical construction 
having, like mathematics or theology, a 
certain internal vitality and interest; 
but in the direction of truthfinding, such 
constructions are merely instrumental like 
any language or any telescope.8 , 
It is not surprising, under these circumstances, to find Santa-
yana only too willing to teach detachment: a poetic philosophy 
6 Reason in Gommon Sense, 252. 
7 soetticism and Anilii801 :Faith, 110. 
8 Tru li, 418. 
76 
of escapism from a world which surpasses his comprehension. He 
.. 
will fulfill the role of spectator, feeling "that the sphere of 
what happens to exist is too alien and accidental to absorb all 
the play of a free mind ••• 9 He appropriately describes himself 
in an early sonnet: 
It is my crown to mock the runner's heat 
With gentle wonder and with laughter sweet.10 
During Santayana's years at Harvard his contemporaries had noted 
this same tendency, so that Professor James, in a letter recom-
mending Santayana for the chair of philosophy then vacant at 
Harvard, could say of him that he was not only a very honest' 
and unworldly character, but also "a spectator rather than an 
actor by temperament" .11 
Naturally this aloofness of spirit left its stamp on Santa-
yana's philosophy. Essence, matter, truth, and spirit are log-
ical categories, intended to describe a natural dynamic process, 
and are actual only in so far as a mind eVolves them.12 Hence 
the pictorial, rather than the analytic, character of Santa-
yana's philosophy. Santayana's goal for speculation, to absorb 
and be absorbed into the truth,13 is redolent of the Indian 
philosophies. Every moment one expects the terms "Brahman or 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
George Santayana, Winds of Doctrine: ~S..;;.t-iFu:.;.;d.;;;i~e~s~i==n~C..;:;o.;;;n:.;;t~em:=:.a;p..;:;o.;;ra.;;:=.r"'-YI 
opinion! Chas. Scribner's Sons, New York, 1913, 24. 
l01d., 09. 
Barton, II, 270. 
Spirit, 277. 
Reason in Common Sense, 28. 
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"Nirvana" to express his concept of the highest good of the 
.. 
spirit, pure intuition.14 But the detachment of spirit which 
Santayana teaches lacks the passivity of Indian detachment; for 
Santayana's idea is to enjoy possessions while still being de-
tached from them: to transcend material possessions rather than 
despise them.15 
Santayana's philosophy may be a "veracious and fearless 
self-expression,,16 beoause its author has utilized his own ex-
perience to portray the typical man. Being a poet, perhaps 
Santayana believed that he would strike the deeper ohords of 
human nature, so that the introspective man might find his own 
soul sketched in Santayana's pages, and experience the joy of 
kindred feeling. Of necessity, then, this pictorial philosophy 
seeks no ultimate causes, and consequently is unscientifio. 
However much Santayana abhors dogmatizing, he unblushingly 
enunciates his own dogmas. With materialism as the "pre-sup-
'position of conventional sanity,,,17 Santayana's explanation 
must repeatedly register nought but "brute facts". Consequent-
ly, his philosophy becomes more an interpretation than an ex-
planation of these facts. Can this be the reason for Santa-
yana's preferenoe for the name "esthete,,?18 Indeed, he is a 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
SEirit, 91. 
lId., 200. 
Durant, 300. 
Sohilpp, 17. 
O'Connor, O.S.M., interviews. 
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mystical poet, patiently seeking peace in a turbulent w~r1d. 
The woods and the sierras teach him a poetic, not a philosophic, 
lesson. 
It is no transcendental logic that they 
teach; and they give no sign of any de-
liberate morality seated in the world. 
It is rather the vanity and superfici-
ality of all logic, the needlessness of 
argument, the relativity of morals, the 
strength of time, the fertility of matter, 
the variety, the unspeakable variety, of 
possible life. Everything is measurable 
and conditioned, indefinitely repeated, 
yet, in repetition, twisted somewhat from 
its old form. Everywhere is beauty, and 
nowhere permanence, everywhere is an in-
cipient harmony, nowhere an inteni~on, 
nor a responsibility, nor a plan. 
Without doubt the world of "transcendental materialism" 1's 
a world of chaotic beauty. It is a biessing for him that 
santayana can find refuge from his chaotic world of matter in 
the imaginative life of reason, for he has always considered 
knowledge tOr be "a part of the imagination in its tenas and in 
its seat.,,20 With the terms of knowledge no longer grounded in 
the real world, but in the imagination, all becomes for him "a 
tale told, if not by an idiot, at least by a dreamer. ,,21 From 
the peaceful seclusion of this transcendental dream, Santayana 
looks back to the world of matter to chide its ignorance: 
o world, thou choosest not the better partt 
It is not wisdom to be only wise, 
19 Genteel Tradition, 190. 
20 schJPp, 19-20. 
21 Ibid. 
r 
And on the inward vision close the eyes, • 
But it is wisdom to believe the heart. 
Columbus found a world, and had no chart, 
Save one that faith deciphered in the skies; 
To trust the soul's invincible surmise 
Was all his science and his only art. 
Our knowledge is a torch of smoky pine 
That lights the pathway but one step ahead 
Across a void of mystery and dread. 
Bid, then, the tender light of faith to shine 
By which alone the mortal heart is led • 
Unto the thinking of the thought divine. 22 
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In this final rejection of materialism for his idealism, 
Santayana confirms us in the opinion that these two elements 
can not compose a sound, consistent philosophy. Of itself his 
materialism is incapable of explaining the existing world, and 
thus matter remains for him "a pre-supposition of conventional 
sanity.,,23 As an esthete Santayana transcends his materialism 
to live the imaginative life of the realm of essence. 
22 Edman, 22. 
23 Schilpp, 17. 
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APPENDIX I 
REPLY TO FATHER MUNSON'S QUESTIONSl 
1. Positions, foundations, or principles may be prejudices--
ruling over thought spontaneously and undiscovered---or they 
may be ultimate discoveries of inevitable pre-suppositions, on 
which an explicit system may be constructed. 
Assuming that you mean the latter, I should say that the 
logical basis of my mature philosophy was the principle of 
identity (qualitative logical possibility or definiteness) in 
terms which I call essences. (An essence is only by accident 
the essence of a thing, when there happens to be something 
that exemplifies that character. The essence or character it-
self is a mere possibility, a defining term, ideal and non-
existent. The realm of essence is not limited to the Logos 
or morphology of the existing cosmos, as in the Platonists, 
but extends over all the "possible worlds" from which Leibniz 
says that God must have chosen this one because it was the 
best. ) 
The realm of essence is absolutely infinite and no 
1 This "Reply" was written to the author in Mr. Santayana's 
own hand. It was received in a letter from Rev. Terence 
O'Connor, O.S.M., dated April 16, 1947. This would indi-
cate some time in late March or early April as the probable 
date of composition of the "Reply". 
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possible essence can be expunged from it. To expun~e it 
would require us first to identify it. But to identify it 
would be to assign to it the only reality it claims, i.e., 
its inevitable place among possibles, like the place of any 
number among the series of numbers. 
Vfllen this inevitable infinity of the possible is under-
stood and the inevitableness of the ideal relations between 
essences, involved in the eternal identity of each of them, 
something very important becomes evident about any existing-
world. Such a world is inevitably contingent, and need not 
have existed. In other words, everything might just as 
easily have been different fram what it is. The so-called 
"laws of nature" do not prevail (if ·and When they do) by any 
necessity: they are merely descriptions of observed facts. 
As myoId friend Emile Boutroux put it, they are all contin-
gent. Regularity in nature is neither necessary nor impos-
sible. How far it extends and what character it has are 
questions for science to investigate, not for metaphysics to 
decide. 
2. So many points are touched here that I cannot reply 
without separating them. 
(a) The place of the psyohe in the material world.---
Nature advances on a broad front but piecemeal; so that the 
movement at each point, though repeating itself if left 
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free, is often modified by interference from the neighporing 
movements, or even disappears in the melting pot. Of these 
attempted repetitions the most interesting at the level of 
human life is heredity. This involves an extraordinary de-
gree or amount of involution in the seed, so that when suit-
ably planted this seed may expand into all the organs of the 
parent body. The Aristotelian name for such involution is 
poutentiality [sic] or existence in potentia. This ~s not 
mere logical possibility, but-physical potency or dynamism; 
and I call it the psyche. This is an observable biological 
cycle or "trope" (as I call it) and the "psychic", in this 
sense, must not be confused with the "psychological" or sub-
jective conscious element. The pl~ce of the psyche in the 
material world is therefore a perfectly discoverable one open 
to scientific investigation and capable, I think, of great de-
velopment both in extension (telepathy, prophecy, communica-
tion, etc.) and in depth (psycho-analysis, etc.) 
(b) Place of Spirit in the psyche.--- The reaction of animals 
on any stimulus from a distance, like that of plants turning 
to the light, is transcendent, i.e., it regards something 
which is not the movement of the organ itself, but is a move-
ment of the organ towards an object external to it. But where 
locomotion is pOSSible, the organism affected may move as a 
whole towards the source of the stimulus, and even seize or 
absorb it. The transcendence here acquires a subjective 
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spiritual accompaniment; it composts perception. In ~s sub-
jective or organic sensibility an animal has only feeling or 
intuition of something vague and inarticulate; but in his in-
dicative alertness and expectation his perception is transcend-
ent cognitively and I is sensation and faith or anticipation. We 
then have what is, or aspires to be, knowledge. The realm of 
spirit thus emanates from and overarches the life of matter, 
when this becomes self-transcendent. And it is interesting to 
observe that the field ~pen to spirit from the very first in 
[SiC] indefinite in extent. The essences intuited are seen or 
felt against a continuous background, virtually all time and 
all existence. This is the spiritual counterpart of the cosmic 
range of all physical tensions, and perfectly natural. 
(c) My "transcendentalism" is not at all transcendent faith in 
matter, much less in essence, which latter demands no faith, 
but only intuition or definition of ideal or aesthetic terms. 
What is "transcendental" in my system is only spirit itself in 
its station on this side of the footlights. Spirit for me is 
no substance but only a function of the psyche, when life is 
concentrated and synthesized at one point, poetically the 
"heart" or "soul," from which all things are surveyed or sur-
veyable. For itself, consciously, spirit is thus disembodied; 
but it has a temporal a~d spatial station and point of view, 
and endures all the accidents and paSSions of the body: so that 
it feels only too much its dependence and captivity there. But 
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that is a one-sided sentiment: more normally, the spirit is the 
voice or prayer of the natural man in his physical and social 
plights; so that it represents the body morally as well as bio-
logically in the fourth dimension of memory, foresight, and 
judgment. 
(d) As to scientific and literary psychology, the distinction 
is not meant to separate the compound life which is the object, 
but only to remove confusion in the method of treating it the-
oretically. English psychology and philosophy rely on subjec-
tive data, which they turn into substances (without using this 
honest word): that is literary psychology or autobiography 
turned into metaphysics or (as I should call it with the 
ancients) into physics. But to attribute to such ideal data 
causal effects, potential existence, or capacity to breed like 
rabbits, is superstition. Subjective data may be SignS of 
powers at work; but they are the "insubstantial fabric of a 
vision" in their own plane of appearance. 
Scientific psychology must be studied in the object, like 
medicine, though of course without neglecting the indications 
that the tlsubject tt may give of his sensations: since these are 
symptoms and signs. I accept behaviorism in the positive sense 
of positing a continuous material process underlying all life: 
all appearances and phenomena have organs and substance at work 
beneath. But my study has always been humanistic, not scien-
r 
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tific, and I leave the detail of medicine as of all p~sics to 
the specialists. 
Literary psychology has dramatic and inspirational advan-
tages over scientific psychology. It evokes feelings and 
thoughts which though actuall:· (sicJ bred in the psychologist 
or poet, may be literally true of other people's experience. 
Physics, on the contrary, never gives literal knowledge, but 
only conventional human renderings of non-human events. 
r 
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Via Santo Stefano Rotundo, 6, 
Rome, June 15, 1947 
Dear Father Munson, 
Your difficulties in understanding my philosophy do not 
surprise me, and I think they are insurmountable so long as you 
reason on Scholastic axioms such as nihil dat quod non habet. 
Since the "quod" or "quid" is defined as an essence--nothing 
existent is'definable--the system of the world becomes entire-
ly a system of essences, and their connectioDSlogical: that 
makes the syste~ meta-physical. But I have no metaphysics: 
essence, truth, and spirit are indeed non-physical; but for 
that very reason they are not to be invoked at all in physics 
or cosmology, which deals with common sense facts--assumed to 
exist by themselves--and studies their factual relations with-
out pretending to explain or understand them. The perfect in-
nocence of genuine men of science in this respect is admirable 
and touching. 
Now, I leave all matters of fact to be catalogued in this 
unexplained way by the natural sciences: and my epistemology 
and psychology are radically and wholly biological, not oon-
I A letter written in Santayana's own hand in response to the 
author's reply to the letter quoted in Appendix I. 
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ceptualistic or metaphysical at all. Naturally they dQ not 
meet the requirements of a metaphysical system. But does any 
fact do so? Are smell, sound, and light impossible data of 
sense unless they exist first as such in camphor, bells, and 
etherial vibrations? 
Yours sincerely, 
G. Santayana 
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